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ABSTRACT  
This study explores the different approaches to managing the conflict of criminal 
jurisdiction over cybercrime with the aim of comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach. It argues that the most effective solution to this 
dilemma is to determine certain factors to be considered and evaluated by a body 
established for such a purpose or by the concerned states themselves in order to decide 
which country will take the exclusive competence over the cybercrime in accordance 
with the facts of each individual case and taking into account the characteristics of 
cybercrime. Establishment of these factors should reflect the interests of the different 
stakeholders related to cybercrime that include like other crimes the interest of 
victim(s), criminal(s), and concerned states. As long as it is accepted internationally that 
the jurisdiction over cybercrime can be established based on territory, active and passive 
personality, as well as the protective principles, the suggested factors should also 
include the interests of the state where the crime is committed, the state of the offender’s 
nationality, the state of the victim’s nationality, and the state whose vital interests have 
been affected by the crime. In addition, these factors should contain the interest of 
criminal proceedings as it is a must to achieve the interests of all the stakeholders. In 
my opinion, these factors should not be given equal weight as many factors are more 
relevant than others in light of the cybercrime’ particularities and the decision in this 
regard should be reached on the basis of an aggregate balance of all these factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction                                                                                                                           1 
 
II. Fundamental Characteristics of Cybercrime                                                                          7 
A. Transnational Character of Cybercrime                                                                                  7 
B. Cybercrime could be “Nowhere and Everywhere”                                                                 12 
 
III. International Cooperation against Cybercrime                                                                    15 
A. International Police Cooperation                                                                                         15 
1. International Criminal Police Organization                                                                       15 
2. European Police Office “EUROPOL”                                                                             16 
B. International Judicial Cooperation                                                                                          17 
1. Extradition                                                                                                                    18 
2. Mutual Legal Assistance                                                                                                   19 
C. International and National Efforts to Enhance International Cooperation against 
Cybercrime                                                                                                                        21 
 
IV. Jurisdiction over Cybercrime                                                                                             26 
A. Jurisdiction in International Law                                                                                        26 
1. Territorial Principle                                                                                                        27                             
2. Active Nationality Principle                                                                                            29 
3. Passive Nationality Principle                                                                                         32 
4. Protective Principle                                                                                                        34 
5. Universality Principle                                                                                                    37 
B. Expansive Jurisdiction Approach over Cybercrime                                                           41 
C. Conflict of Jurisdiction in Cybercrime                                                                               42 
 
V. Moving Forward to Overcome Conflict of Jurisdiction in Cybercrime                                  47 
A. Evaluating Different Approaches Regarding the Positive Conflict of Jurisdiction          47 
B. Factors to be Considered in Solving the Positive Conflict of Jurisdiction                             52 
1. Interest of the Victim                                                                                                     54 
2. Interest of the Perpetrator                                                                                             54 
3. Interest of the State of the Territorial Jurisdiction                                                        56 
4. Interest of the State of the Offender’s Nationality                                                        58 
5. Interest of the State of the Victim’s Nationality                                                           59 
6. Interest of the State whose Vital Interest(s) has been Affected by Cybercrime            60 
7. Interest of Criminal Proceedings                                                                                       61 
 
VI. Conclusion                                                                                                                               67  
 I. Introduction 
The Internet has changed the way individuals, governments, businesses, and other 
organs of society manage their activities by providing them with many online tools that 
can facilitate the conducting of such activities. Even though it can improve efficiency, 
it makes them vulnerable to cybercrime, cyber-attack, and cyber-espionage.1 In 2011, 
at least 2.3 billion persons, the equal of more than one third of the total population of 
the world, had access to the Internet. By the year of 2020, it is anticipated that the 
number of networked devices will be more than the number of people by six to one 
which will alter the existing concepts of the Internet. Actually, in the hyper connected 
world of the future, it will be difficult to see a computer crime or may be any crime, 
which does not include an electronic evidence associated with Internet Protocol (IP) 
connectivity.2  
 
Indeed, the development and use of virtual banks, electronic money, and online 
shopping has become one of the main reasons for the development of a new kind of a 
crime that can be committed far away from the actual crime scene. In fact, the 
communications in cyberspace may be transmitted through different methods, including 
local phone companies, Internet service providers, long distance carriers, wireless and 
satellite networks, and may pass through computers located in different states before 
attacking targeted systems in many other states. Also, the cybercrime’s evidence may 
be stored on an electronic server in a different jurisdiction far away from where the 
perpetrator committed the crime.3 
 
Nowadays, there is a gradual increase in the numbers, cost, and sophistications of 
attacks against the infrastructures of information systems by cyber criminals. In reality, 
such attacks threaten the fundamental and growing reliance upon this technology in 
 
1 David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 Minn. J. Int'l L. 
347, 347 (2013). 
2  United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, xvii 
(February 2013), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-
crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf. 
3  Ana I. Cerezo ET AL., International Cooperation to Fight Transnational Cybercrime, 
Proceedings - 2nd International Annual Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident Analysis, 
WDFIA 2007 13, 14 (2007). 
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order to manage business, carry messages, and process information by corporations, 
governments, individuals, and other entities.4  
 
Generally, the terms computer crime, information technology crime, cybercrime, and 
high-tech crime are often used interchangeably for referring to two main categories of 
crimes. The first one includes those crimes where the computer is the target of the 
offense such as attacks on network confidentiality and availability as well as the 
unauthorized access to and illicit tampering with systems, programs or data. Whereas, 
the second category comprises the traditional crimes like fraud, forgery, and theft which 
are committed with the assistance of or by means of computers, computer networks and 
related communications and information technology.5  
 
Cybercrimes differ from traditional crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery in several 
ways. Cybercrimes can be committed from a remote location outside the affected state’ 
boundaries which creates greater challenges to law enforcement authorities; it is not 
difficult to learn how to commit a particular cybercrime; its commission may require 
few resources in comparison to the potential damage it can cause; and, it is not often 
clearly illegal.6  
 
There are no internationally unified definitions of computer crime, high technology 
crime, and cyber fraud as they have different meanings for criminal justice professionals 
around the world.7 Therefore, instead of defining the cybercrime, the international or 
regional cybercrime instruments have listed several acts that per se constitute 
cybercrimes. For example, the Council of Europe’s Convention on  Cybercrime 
(Budapest Convention) considers the following acts as cybercrimes: offenses against 
the integrity, confidentiality and availability of computer data and systems which 
include illegal interception, illegal access, data interference, system interference, and 
misuse of devices; computer related forgery; computer related fraud; offenses related 
 
4 Abraham D. Sofaer & Seymour E. Goodman, Cyber Crime and Security: The Transnational 
Dimension, in THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF CYBERCRIME AND TERRORISM 1, 1 
(Abraham D. Sofaer & Seymour E. Goodman eds., 2001). 
5 Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in 
Cyberspace, 10 Int'l J.L. & Info. Tech. 139, 144 (2002). 
6 Id. at 142. 
7  Marc Goodman, International Dimensions of Cybercrime, in CYBERCRIMES: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 311, 320 (Sumit Ghosh & Elliot Turrini eds., 2010). 
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to child pornography; and offenses related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights..8 
 
The Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses (Arab 
Convention) provides for a wider range of crimes than the Budapest Convention. It 
includes offense of illicit access; offense of illicit interception; offense against the 
integrity of data; offense of misuse of information technology means; offenses 
committed by means of information technology to include forgery, fraud, pornography 
and those offences related to terrorism, organized crime, copyright and adjacent Rights; 
and illicit use of electronic payment tools.9 
 
In fact, cybercrime knows no boundaries due to the architecture of the Internet which 
allows the data to be transmitted all over the world in just few seconds without any 
relevant obstacles or barriers. Therefore, it involves a transnational dimension as the 
perpetrator can cause extensive harm to numerous victims in different countries without 
leaving home.10 In addition, there is difficulty in deciding where the cybercrime actually 
takes place.11 That is because the current digital technologies allow the perpetrator of 
cybercrime to be anonymous as he/she can create an email account by providing false 
data, use several complicated Internet applications to alter the actual IP address, and 
benefit from encryption technology to hide any traces of the crime. All of these 
challenges make the tracing of cybercrime very difficult and time consuming for law 
enforcement authorities.12  
 
As a result of, such special characteristics of cybercrime oblige states all over the world 
to depend upon each other in fighting against this serious crime. Therefore, it is a must 
to enhance all forms of international cooperation between states through the effective 
response to the mutual legal assistance and extradition requests. That is because such 
 
8 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime 4-8, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S No. 185 (entered 
into force Jul. 1, 2004). 
9 League of Arab States, Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses 5-
9, Dec. 21, 2010 (entered into force Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://www.lasportal.org/ar/legalnetwork/Documents/ الاتفاقیة العربیة لمكافحة جرائم تقنیة المعلومات .pdf. 
10 Marc Goodman, supra note 7, at 315. 
11  Jean-Baptiste Maillart, The limits of subjective territorial jurisdiction in the context of 
cybercrime, ERA F.  1, 4 (2018). 
12 Jonathan Clough, Cybercrime, 37 Commw. L. Bull. 671, 673 (2011). 
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effective and rapid international cooperation is urgently required in order to smoothly 
collect the evidence from another jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting an efficient 
prosecution or to apprehend the offender who exists in a foreign country.13  
 
The transnational dimension of cybercrime has encouraged the drafters of international 
instruments and national laws to adopt an expansive approach for asserting jurisdiction 
over cybercrime with the aim of combatting this crime and ensuring that there is no safe 
havens for criminals.14 As a result, jurisdiction over cybercrime can be established 
based on several bases including territorial, active nationality, passive nationality, and 
protective principles. 
 
However, such a broad approach can lead to situations whereby more than one country 
may claim jurisdiction over the same cybercrime which results in the dilemma of 
positive conflict over jurisdiction. This conflict may lead to several practical problems 
as it may hinder the mechanism of effective international cooperation in fighting against 
cybercrime, the violation of the fundamental principle of ne bis in idem, and the 
duplication of efforts by law enforcement officials of the involved countries.  
 
This study explores the different approaches for managing the conflict of criminal 
jurisdiction over cybercrime with the aim of comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach. It argues that the most effective solution to this 
dilemma is to determine certain factors to be considered and evaluated by a body 
established for such a purpose or by the concerned states themselves in order to decide 
which country will take the exclusive competence over the cybercrime in accordance 
with the facts of each individual case and taking into account the characteristics of 
cybercrime. Establishment of these factors should reflect the interests of the different 
stakeholders related to cybercrime that includes like other crimes the interest of 
victim(s), criminal(s), and concerned states. 
  
As long as it is accepted internationally that the jurisdiction over cybercrime can be 
established based on territory, active and passive personality, as well as the protective 
 
13 Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, supra note 5, at 185. 
14 Jonathan Clough, supra note 12, at 678. 
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principles, the suggested factors should also include the interests of the state where the 
crime is committed, the state of the offender’s nationality, the state of the victim’s 
nationality, and the state whose vital interests have been affected by the crime. In 
addition, these factors should contain the interest of criminal proceedings as it is a must 
to achieve the interests of all the stakeholders. 
  
In my opinion, these factors should not be given equal weight as many factors may be 
more relevant than others in light of the cybercrime’ particularities and the decision in 
this regard should be reached on the basis of an aggregate balance of all these factors. I 
contend that such proposed solution is better than the attempt to solve such conflict 
through negotiation between the concerned states without providing them with concrete 
factors to be considered in reaching a decision in this regard. 
 
Chapter two of this study explains the main characteristics of cybercrime which include 
its transnational nature and the possibility to be committed “nowhere and everywhere”. 
Chapter three presents the different types of international cooperation to include the 
police and judicial cooperation and the main forms of the latter containing the 
extradition and mutual legal assistance requests as well as the international and national 
efforts to enhance such cooperation against cybercrime.  
 
Chapter four details the different bases for exercising the criminal jurisdiction to include 
the territorial, active and passive personality, protective, and universality principles as 
well as their weight in the contemporary international law and how the main 
characteristics of cybercrime encourage for adopting an expansive approach toward 
jurisdiction over cybercrime which may result in the positive conflict of several 
jurisdictions.  
 
Finally, chapter five discusses in detail the different approaches for resolving the 
dilemma of concurrent jurisdictional claims between more than one country over the 
same cybercrime and illustrates the  advantages and disadvantages of each view. Then, 
it argues that there are certain factors which should be considered and evaluated in order 
to reach an adequate decision to solve such a conflict. This factors should include the 
interest of victim(s), the interest of the perpetrator(s), the interest of the state where the 
crime was committed, the interest of the state of offender’s nationality, the interest of 
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the state of victim’s nationality, the interest of the state whose one of its vital interests 
has been affected by the crime, and the interest of criminal proceedings.  
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II. Fundamental Characteristics of Cybercrime 
Generally, there are two notable features of cybercrime including its transnational 
nature and it can be “nowhere and everywhere”. This chapter details the meaning, the 
reasons behind, and different types of cybercrime that have this a cross-border 
dimension as well as several examples of case law that reflect such a character. In 
addition, it demonstrates how such feature creates obstacles for law enforcement 
authorities and challenges the traditional conceptualizations of criminal jurisdiction 
which has encouraged the adoption of a broad approach of jurisdiction over cybercrime. 
Then, this chapter shows the difficulty in determining the location where the cybercrime 
originates from, the means used by the offender to hide his/her location when 
committing this crime using examples from case law. It also illustrates how this 
character poses many difficulties for law enforcement authorities in the world. 
 
A. Transnational Character of Cybercrime 
Transnational crime is defined by the Ninth United Nation Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of the Offenders as “offences whose inception, prevention 
and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country.”15 This congress 
considered computer crime as one of eighteen categories of transnational crime.16 
 
According to Article (3/2) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, “an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) it is committed in more 
than one State; (b) it is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, 
planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) it is committed in one 
State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in 
more than one State; or (d) it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in 
another State”.17  
 
 
15  The Ninth United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of the 
Offenders, interim report by the secretariat 4 (April 1995),  
https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Previous_Congresses/9th_Congress_1995/017_A
CONF.169.15.ADD.1_Interim_Report_Strengthening_the_Rule_of_Law.pdf. 
16 Id. at 12. 
17 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 6, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 
U.N.T.S 209 (entered into force Sep. 29, 2003). 
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Cybercrime is covered by this Convention if it is committed by an organized criminal 
group as defined in Article (2/a) of the Convention18 and involves more than one 
country in its commission, perpetration, planning, direct or indirect effects, or the 
activities of the criminal group. As a result of being subject to this Convention, the 
effective rules in relation to international cooperation between states included in this 
convention can be applied to the cybercrime of concern. This convention can also be 
used as a legal basis for such cooperation between the concerned states. 
 
In most cases, cybercrime involves a transnational dimension because of the 
interconnected nature of the global networks allows the offender in one country to easily 
commit a cybercrime from his/her location which may affect victims in several 
countries.19 As Paul Schiff Berman explains “in an electronically connected world the 
effects of any given action may immediately be felt elsewhere with no relationship to 
physical geography at all.”20 The transnational cybercrime may be committed by a non-
state entity or by a governmental institution and may negatively affect individuals, 
corporations, governmental entities, non-governmental organizations, or other 
entities.21  
 
There are several factors that effectively encourage criminals to commit a transnational 
cybercrime. The first factor is that the global target pool of computers and users of the 
internet which allows perpetrator to cause great harm to victims in other countries with 
no more effort than would be required to commit the crime in their own countries. The 
second factor is the widespread differences between countries in the legal, regulatory, 
or policy framework regarding cybercrime which affects negatively the efforts against 
this crime.22 Such differences are due to several reasons including the absence of one 
unified and worldwide definition of cybercrime.23 Also, the different approaches toward 
 
18 Id. at 5. 
19 Ellen S. Podgor, Cybercrime: National, Transnational, or International, 50 Wayne L. Rev. 
97, 97 (2004). 
20 PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND 
BORDERS 92 (2012). 
21  Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Transnational Cyber Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional 
Challenges, 43 Yale J. Int'l L. 191, 196 (2018). 
22 Abraham D. Sofaer & Seymour E. Goodman, supra note 4, at 6. 
23  Ales Zavrsnik, Cybercrime Definitional Challenges and Criminological Particularities, 2 
Masaryk U. J.L. & Tech. 1, 10 (2008). 
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the control of the Internet i.e. whether the Internet should be controlled by itself or the 
government should interfere through certain procedures to protect the people from 
cybercrime such as the surveillance or blocking access to certain suspicious websites 
and what is the limit of such interference.24  
 
The third factor is the need for effective international cooperation between the 
concerned states in investigating and prosecuting this crime especially in relation to 
mutual legal assistance which will be discussed later at the next chapter.25 The fourth 
factor is the vulnerability of the existing computer programs that can be exploited by 
criminals because the designers of such software programs concentrate primarily on 
making their use much easier and consider the reliability and security as secondary 
issues.26  
 
As stated in the introduction,27 a cybercrime can be a computer crime or a computer 
related crime. Most often, the computer crime has a cross-border nature. The two 
common examples are infectious malware and denial-of-service (DoS). The first is a 
code designed to cause damage to data, networks or hosts when a user downloads an 
infected attachment from an Email’s message or accesses a corrupt website.28 There are 
different forms of this malware to include viruses, worms, trojans, ransomware, adware, 
spyware, malvertising, file-less malware, and hybrid form.29 Whereas, the DoS is a 
barrage of fake requests from a single source launched by a perpetrator which 
overwhelm the intended computer system, network or server. Unlike malware which 
alters the functionality of the system, DoS attacks temporarily deny access to the target 
system. Malware and DoS could be merged to produce a distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attack.30  
 
 
24 Soumyo D. Moitra, Developing Policies for Cybercrime - Some Empirical Issues, 13 Eur. J. 
Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 435, 441-42 (2005). 
25 See discussion infra notes 72-74. 
26 Abraham D. Sofaer & Seymour E. Goodman, supra note 4, at 19-20. 
27 See discussion supra note 5. 
28 Alexandra Perloff-Giles, supra note 21, at 197. 
29 Rogar A. Grimes, 9 types of malware and how to recognize them, CSO FROM IDG (May. 1, 
2019, 6:32 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2615925/security-your-quick-guide-to-
malware-types.html. 
30 Alexandra Perloff-Giles, supra note 21, at 197. 
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Likewise, conventional crimes that committed by means of computer that are called 
computer-related crimes can have a transnational dimension. Examples include forgery, 
stalking, and child pornography. For example, at 2002, German police investigation 
lead to the synchronous execution of thirty-seven search warrants in ten countries on 
members of a private Internet group exchanging and downloading child pornography 
on the Internet.31  
 
Furthermore, the rapid development of digital technology in the form of cell phones and 
other devices results in several forms of digital evidence extracted from these devices 
can be used to prove ordinary offences.32 In the meantime, sophisticated criminal groups 
benefit from the Internet in the commission of different transnational organized crimes 
such as the human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, and money laundering. In reality, 
this occurs through the taking of advantage of Internet technologies to be untraceable 
by law enforcement authorities.33  
 
Indeed, there are many examples of case law that reflect the transnational nature of 
cybercrime. One of the most famous cases is the Love Bug virus,34 which spread around 
the world in May 2000 and led to the shutting down of business and government 
computers in over forty-five countries resulting in damages of many billions of dollars. 
Later, this crime was attributed to someone in the Philippines which did not have a 
cybercrime law at this time. Because of that, the act was not illegal in the Philippines 
and the perpetrator did not subject to prosecution in this state which also refused 
extradition request from other countries because of the absence of dual criminality as a 
primary condition for extradition. As a result, this person was not prosecuted by any 
state. 
 
 
31 Peter Grabosky, The Global Dimension of Cybercrime, 6 Global Crime 146, 147 (2004). 
32 Michael A. Sussmann, The Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and Computer-
Related Crime at the Millenium, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 455 (1999). 
33 See discussion infra note 43. 
34 Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. IV Schwerha, Cybercrime Havens Challenges and Solutions, 
17 Bus. L. Today 49, 49 (2007). 
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Another example of such cross-border dimension of cybercrime is the Vladimir L.Levin 
case.35 A group of Russian computer hackers attempted to steal about 10.7 million 
Dollars from Citibank customers' accounts in the USA by manipulating its 
computerized fund transfer system. In this case, L.Levin gained access over forty times 
to Citibank's fund transfer system using stolen account identification numbers and 
passwords and authorized the transfer of funds from Citibank's head office in New 
Jersey to accounts which Levin and his co-conspirators had in several countries by using 
a computer terminal in his employer's office in St Petersburg. After that, an arrest 
warrant was issued by a US court but his extradition was rejected because there was no 
treaty for extradition at this time between the USA and Russia. Later, Levin was arrested 
in England and extradited to the USA based on the extradition treaty between them. 
 
At 2003, the information gathered for the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime’s 
Comprehensive study showed that the percentage of cybercrime acts that involve a 
transnational dimension was around 70% in Europe, 50% in Asia and Oceania, 40% in 
Africa, and 30% in the Americas.36 Conversely, cybercrime can be a local one which 
adjusts to the traditional model of crime if its commission takes place entirely within 
the territory of one state i.e. the victim and perpetrator physically exist in the territory 
of the same country where the crime is committed.37 One example is the illegal access 
to a company’s computer system for the purpose of stealing a sensitive information 
from the hard disk. 
 
In fact, this transnational dimension of cybercrime creates new opportunities for 
criminals which imposes great technical and legal challenges for the local law 
enforcement authorities in investigating and prosecuting this crime regarding the 
collection of evidence and apprehension of criminals.38 Also, it challenges the 
traditional conceptualization of criminal jurisdiction as the criminal act no longer 
necessarily takes place wholly within the territory of one state.39 Thus, this 
 
35 Ikenga K.E. Oraegbunam, Towards Containing the Jurisdictional Problems in Prosecuting 
Cybercrimes: Case Reviews and Responses, 7 Nnamdi Azikiwe U. J. Int'l L. & Juris. 26, 27 
(2016). 
36 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 183. 
37  Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime jurisdiction, 46 Crime, L. and SOC. Change 189, 193 (2006). 
38 Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, supra note 5, at 142. 
39 Susan W. Brenner, supra note 37, at 190. 
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extraterritorial nature has encouraged the drafters of domestic laws and international 
and regional cybercrime instruments to adopt an expanded approach in relation to 
jurisdiction over cybercrime which may lead to the situation of positive conflict of 
criminal jurisdiction over the same cybercrime between two or more countries and this 
point will be discussed later in detail at chapter four of this study.40 
 
In sum, there are no borders on the Internet as the cyberspace makes sovereign 
boundaries and physical space irrelevant. In fact, the perpetrator only needs a computer 
and an Internet connection to commit a cybercrime that can affect a several victims in 
other countries which destroys the conventional jurisdictional realms of sovereign 
states. 
  
B. Cybercrime Could be “Nowhere and Everywhere” 
The traditional crime is usually linked to a geographic location where the crime was 
committed and the criminal is physically existing at the crime scene. Therefore, law 
enforcement officials can apprehend the offender and bring him/her to justice. Whereas, 
cybercrime frequently is not clearly linked to any geographic location as it can be 
committed from any location with Internet access. Also, in many situations, it is difficult 
to determine where the cybercrime originates from. It may appear to have been 
committed in a certain country but actually originates elsewhere and having been routed 
through several jurisdictions before reaching its “last address”.41 
 
In fact, any action on the Internet can be attributed to a single user through identifying 
the IP address which pinpoints the specific network and device being used for accessing 
the Internet and identifies its location. An IP address can be static assigned on a 
permanent basis as in the case of website address or dynamic temporarily assigned for 
the duration of an online session from a pool of addresses available to an Internet 
Service Provider.42 Nevertheless, the perpetrator of such a crime can easily hide his/her 
location with anonymizing services that make the task of the identification by the law 
enforcement extremely difficult. Indeed, there are several digital technologies available 
 
40 See discussion infra note 178.  
41 Peter Grabosky, supra note 31, at 150. 
42 United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, 62 
(2012), 
 https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf. 
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online that facilitate the anonymity on the Internet. They are used by the criminals to 
hide their IP address or change it in order to be untraceable by the law enforcement 
authorities such as VPN software that allows the user to change his/her IP address to 
another fake one and browse the web anonymously.43 
 
An example that proves the difficulty in determining where the cybercrime originates 
from is a case of a cybercrime committed in Hong Kong. In this case the evidence 
collected in an investigation initiated by Hong Kong police upon a complaint from a 
local woman who had been a victim of a cyber-stalker linked to a system in Colorado 
proved that the perpetrator resides in Hong Kong. Whereas, the offending 
communications seemed falsely to be routed through a server in Colorado.44 Another 
instance that confirms such difficulty is the extensive cyber-attack against several 
governmental institutions in the USA and South Korea at July 2009. Initially, the South 
Korean government believed that this attack had been committed from North Korea. 
Later, security experts suggested that this attack may have operated from the United 
Kingdom and not North Korea.45 
 
In fact, such challenges in identifying the perpetrator of a cybercrime and his/her 
location due to the use of digital technologies have posed many difficulties for the law 
enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution process of this crime. 
Hence, those authorities are obliged to be well-informed of rapidly developing 
technologies which requires advanced training in new investigative techniques and the 
use of highly developed technologies to detect the criminal and bring him/her to 
justice.46  
 
In sum, this chapter has shown the fundamental characteristics of cybercrime to include 
its transnational nature and the possibility of being “nowhere and everywhere”. The 
next chapter details the two types of international cooperation including police and 
 
43 Rob Mardisalu, How to Hide my IP Address (March 2019), https://thebestvpn.com/hide-ip/ 
44 Peter Grabosky, supra note 31, at 150-51. 
45 Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet against Cyberterrorism and 
Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 57, 60 (2010). 
46 P.N. Grabosky, Crime in Cyberspace: in COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 195, 203 (Phil 
Williams & Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001). 
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judicial cooperation as well as the main forms of the latter to include the extradition and 
mutual legal assistance requests. 
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III. International Cooperation against Cybercrime 
In reality, the transnational nature of cybercrime and the difficulty in identifying the 
perpetrator or the place of the crime’s commission have created several obstacles and 
challenges for law enforcement authorities around the world in relation to the obtaining 
of cross-border evidence and extradition of criminals. Thus, the effective, rapid, and 
well-functioning international cooperation between states on criminal matters is 
essential in enhancing the investigation and prosecution proceedings of cybercrime that 
is facilitated globally and has negative consequences in different states.47 This chapter 
looks at the two types of international cooperation which are police and judicial 
international cooperation. Then, it highlights the most common forms of the judicial 
one to include extradition and mutual legal assistance requests. After that, it illustrates 
the international and national efforts to enhance such cooperation against cybercrime. 
 
A. Police International Cooperation 
Police international cooperation is the exchange of data and information between police 
authorities of different countries with the aim of sharing criminal intelligence, 
conducting investigation, and apprehending suspects.48 Such exchange can be done 
either directly or through one of the inter-governmental organizations such as the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and European Police Office 
(EUROPOL) for the purpose of combatting different kinds of crimes. 
 
1. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
INTERPOL is an inter-governmental organization which has in its membership 194 
countries with the aim of allowing the police authorities in all member states to share 
and access data on crimes and criminals as well as providing them with a wide range of 
technical and operational supports in order to achieve the security of the world.49  
 
 
47 Pedro Verdelho, the effectiveness of international co-operation against cybercrime: examples 
of good practices 1, 4 (2008),  
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId
=09000016802fa3a2. 
48  FREDERIC LEMIEUX, INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION: EMERGING ISSUES, THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2013). 
49 What is Interpol, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL. 
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One of the major functions of INTERPOL is to enhance international cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies to ensure the secure and fast exchange and analysis 
of information related to criminal activities and suspected persons. In fact, it achieves 
this role through the I-24/7 global police communication system which links law 
enforcements in all member countries and allows them to share police information in 
order to enhance the efficiency of criminal investigations.50 Furthermore, this system 
can facilitate bilateral or multilateral police requests or the delivery of a formal legal 
assistance request from one central authority to another.51 
 
The INTERPOL’s cybercrime program is an important tool in this regard. That is 
because its purpose is to support the exchange of information among member states 
through regional working parties and conferences, assist and coordinate international 
operations, and offer training courses to develop and enhance professional standards. In 
addition, it plays an important role in creating a worldwide list of contact officers for 
cybercrime investigations for the purpose of assisting member countries in the event of 
cyberattacks, identifying emerging threats and sharing this intelligence with member 
states, providing a secure web portal for accessing operational information and 
documents, and developing strategic partnerships with other international organizations 
and private sector institutions.52  
 
2. European Police Office “EUROPOL” 
Unlike INTERPOL which composes members from countries around the world, 
EUROPOL is the European union’ law enforcement agency with the main target of 
maintaining security on Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens.53 The main mandate 
of Europol is to promote the effectiveness of cooperation between the law enforcement 
authorities of EU member states in preventing and fighting terrorism and other forms 
of transnational organized crime. Also, it has a fundamental role in the European 
Cybercrime Task Force which is a group of experts from Europol, Eurojust, and the 
European Commission with a mandate to work together with the heads of European 
 
50 The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, supra note 42, at 79-80. 
51 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 187. 
52 The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, supra note 42, at 80. 
53ABOUT EUROPOL, https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol. 
  17 
 
 
Union cybercrime units in order to enhance transnational combating against 
cybercrime.54  
 
In 2013, Europol set up the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) to support the response 
of law enforcement authorities to cybercrime in the EU with the aim of protecting 
European citizens, businesses and governments. In reality, this center has played an 
important role in the fight against cybercrime as it serves as the central hub for criminal 
information and intelligence and has offered highly specialized technical and digital 
forensic support capabilities to investigations and operations. As a result, it has been 
involved in several high-profile operations and on the spot operational support 
deployments which have led to hundreds of arrests as well as it has analyzed very large 
number of files. Moreover, the EC3 issues yearly the Internet Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment “IOCTA” on key results and emerging developments and threats in 
cybercrime.55 
 
B. International Judicial Cooperation 
Besides the police international cooperation, the international judicial cooperation 
between the judicial authorities of different countries is essential in countering 
cybercrime. Traditionally, the legal basis for such cooperation against cybercrime can 
be one of the binding international or regional instruments such as the Commonwealth 
of Independent States Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to 
Computer Information,56 the Budapest Convention,57 the Arab Convention,58 the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
International Information Security,59 or a bilateral agreement or the principle of 
reciprocity which is a promise that the requesting state will provide the requested state 
with the same type of assistance in the future.60 
 
54 The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, supra note 42, at 80-8.  
55EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE – EC3,  https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-
europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3. 
56  The commonwealth of Independent States, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating 
Offences related to Computer Information, June 1, 2001 (entered into force Mar. 14, 2002). 
57 Convention on Cybercrime, Surpa note 8. 
58 Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses, supra note 9. 
59 The shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement between the Governments of the 
Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of 
International Information Security,  June. 16, 2009 (entered into force Jan. 5, 2012). 
60 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 201. 
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In fact, the extradition and mutual legal assistance requests are the most important 
formal mechanisms of international judicial cooperation against cybercrime. Other 
forms of cooperation such as transfer of criminal proceedings or prisoners, asset 
recovery and confiscation of criminal proceeds are less relevant in practice.61  
 
1. Extradition 
One of the most important forms of international judicial cooperation is the extradition 
which is defined by Model Law as the surrender of any person who is sought by the 
requesting state to subject to a criminal prosecution, to stand a trial, or to serve a 
sentence for an extraditable offence.62 The precondition for the acceptance of an 
extradition request is dual criminality which means that the act must be a crime in both 
laws of the requesting and requested states. However, it is not required that the 
underlying activity be punishable with the same type of legal provision.63  
 
Also, the crime which is the subject of an extradition request should be an offence for 
which the laws of the concerned states allow extradition. In reality, the determination 
of what constitutes an extraditable offence is made through a treaty which decides the 
offences for which extradition may be allowed or by the seriousness of the penalty that 
may be imposed by the national law.64	For example, Article (24/a) of the Budapest 
Convention provides that “this Article applies to extradition between Parties for the 
criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this 
Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both Parties concerned 
by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe 
penalty”.65  
 
 
61 Marco Gercke,  UNDERSTANDING CYBERCRIME: PHENOMENA, CHALLENGES AND LEGAL 
RESPONSE 267 (2012). 
62 Model Law on Extradition 8 (2004), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf. 
63 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 60. 
64  United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition 45-46 (September 2012), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-
crime/Publications/Mutual_Legal_Assistance_Ebook_E.pdf. 
65 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 8, at 14. 
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In fact, there are several bases for the refusal of an extradition request which differ from 
one convention to another. According to chapter two of the Model Law on Extradition, 
the extradition request may be rejected in the following circumstances:66 
- If the offence has a political nature. Nevertheless, the model law excludes certain acts 
from being considered as political offence such as murder, inflicting serious bodily 
harm, and kidnapping. 
- If there are substantial grounds to believe that such request has been sent for the purpose 
of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of his/her race, ethnic origin, 
nationality, religion, political opinions, sex or status. 
- If the person sought has been or would be subjected in the requesting state to cruel, or 
torture, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment or will not receive the minimum 
fair trial guarantees in the criminal proceedings in the requesting country.  
- If there has been a final judgement rendered and enforced against the person in relation 
to the offence for which extradition is requested or the prosecution or punishment 
against the person sought is barred by lapse of time, prescription or statute of limitation 
at the time of receiving the request for extradition.  
- If the act is an offence under military law which is not also a crime under ordinary 
criminal code in the requesting country or if the punishment for the offence is the death 
penalty under the law of the requesting country and is not so punishable according to 
the law of the requested state, unless the competent authorities of the requesting country 
submit sufficient assurances that this penalty will not be imposed or, if so, will not be 
carried out.  
- If the person sought is a national of the requested state provided that it will refer the 
case without delay to the competent prosecution authority which is called as the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute).	 
 
2. Mutual Legal Assistance  
In addition to the extradition, there is also the mutual legal assistance. It is a process by 
which the judicial authority in one state seeks and requests assistance from its 
counterpart in another state in gathering evidence to be used in criminal proceedings 
against a specific crime.67 In fact, criminal proceedings are based on evidence which 
 
66 Model Law on Extradition, supra note 62, at 12-25.  
67 Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, surpa note 64, at 19. 
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increasingly is existed outside of the state’ borders. Thus, there is now an increased 
assertion on the international level for the need to develop effective instruments that 
can facilitate assistance with cross border evidence gathering.68  
 
There are several grounds for the refusal of mutual legal assistance as shown in Article 
(3) of the Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. These grounds include if the requested state 
believes that the request, if granted, would prejudice its sovereignty, security, public 
order or other essential public interests; regards the offence as being of a political 
nature; or has substantial grounds to believe that the request has been made for 
prosecuting a person on account of his/her race, sex, religion, nationality, ethnic origin 
or political opinions. Other reasons include if the request relates to an offence whose 
prosecution in the requesting state would be incompatible with the requested state's law 
on double jeopardy; requires the requested state to carry out compulsory measures that 
would be inconsistent with its law; or the act is an offence under military law which is 
not an offence under ordinary criminal law.69  
 
In fact, there are many forms of mutual legal assistance as illustrated in Article (18/3) 
of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime such as the 
taking of a statement from a person, the production of a document, and the execution of 
search, seizure, and freezing orders.70 Regarding cybercrime, the forms of requested 
assistance are listed in the Budapest Convention in Articles (29) to (34) which include 
expedited preservation of stored computer data, expedited disclosure of preserved 
traffic data, the search, seizure, and disclosure of stored computer data, the real-time 
collection of traffic data, the interception of content data, and the access to stored 
computer data with consent or where publicly available.71 
 
In reality, the traditional regime for mutual legal assistance imposes many difficulties 
on the investigations related to cybercrime because the implementation of such a request 
 
68  Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 66, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf. 
69 Id. at 86.   
70 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 17, at 20. 
71 Convention on Cybercrime, surpa note 8, at 18-20. 
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requires time-consuming formal procedures.72 Such a request and its response must be 
made rapidly in the urgent cases because computer data can be deleted very easily which 
makes it impossible to know the perpetrator or collect critical evidence. Also, many 
forms of computer data are stored for only a short time before being deleted. In other 
cases, significant harm to persons or property may occur if evidence is not gathered 
rapidly.73 Thus, such a regime for mutual legal assistance should cope with the required 
speedy response in relation to a cybercrime’s investigation.74 
 
To such an effect, Article (25) of the Budapest Convention provides that “Each Party 
may, in urgent circumstances, make requests for mutual assistance or communications 
related thereto by expedited means of communication, including fax or e-mail, to the 
extent that such means provide appropriate levels of security and authentication 
(including the use of encryption, where necessary), with formal confirmation to follow, 
where required by the requested Party. The requested Party shall accept and respond to 
the request by any such expedited means of communication”.75 Therefore, this article 
encourages the authorities of member states to benefit from the developed means of 
communication in sending or responding to a request for mutual assistance. 
 
C. International and National Efforts to Enhance International Cooperation against 
Cybercrime 
In reality, there are several efforts to promote international cooperation against 
cybercrime. At the international level, different international binding or non-binding 
instruments in relation to cybercrime confirm the importance of both police and judicial 
international cooperation. For example, chapter three of the Budapest Convention 
which sets up the general principles relating to international cooperation, extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, and the establishment of a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week 
network in order to ensure the application of immediate assistance for the purpose of 
ensuring effective investigation and prosecution proceedings against this crime.76 
 
 
72Marco Gercke, supra note 61, at 106. 
73 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime 44 (2001), 
 https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b. 
74 Marco Gercke, supra note 61, at 106. 
75 Convention on Cybercrime, surpa note 8, at 15. 
76 Convention on Cybercrime, Surpa note 8, at 14-21. 
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Also, at the national level, many domestic laws provide for international cooperation. 
For instance, Article (4) of the Egyptian Anti Information Technology Crimes Law No. 
175 for the year 2018 (Egyptian Law) encourages the competent Egyptian authorities 
to cooperate with their counterparts in other countries in relation to the exchange of 
information in order to avoid the occurrence of cybercrime, facilitate their investigation, 
and achieve the tracking of perpetrators.77 
 
Nevertheless, it is a must to better enhance international cooperation against 
cybercrime.78 Indeed, one major way in this regard is to harmonize national laws in 
order to promote the mechanisms of mutual legal assistance and extradition.79  
 
Generally, each country has its own culture, legal tradition, and historical background 
which affects its substantive and procedural laws. Therefore, the international response 
to cybercrime should attempt to accommodate these differences and achieve some 
degree of harmonisation between national substantive and procedural laws for the 
purpose of promoting international cooperation. Such harmonisation between 
substantive laws is urgent to ensure the criminalization of all forms of cybercrime in 
the different countries to eliminate the possibility of safe havens if the conduct is not a 
crime in a specific country which will not only hinder the domestic prosecution but also 
will impede the effective response to the extradition and mutual legal assistance 
requests due to the lack of dual criminality condition.80  
 
Similarly, the consistency between procedural laws is also necessary to promote 
international cooperation through mutual legal assistance requests. Usually, the 
procedural law defines the powers of law enforcement authorities such as the 
competence to seize stored computer data, intercept content data or issue a production 
order, a search warrant of computer systems, or an order for the expedited preservation 
of stored computer data. In fact, a requested state can only provide assistance within its 
 
77 Law No. 175 of 2018 (Law of Anti-Information Technology Crimes), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 
14 Aug. 2018, No. 32 bis c, pp. 3-25 (Egypt) [hereinafter Egyptian Anti-Information Technology 
Crimes Law]. 
78 See discussion supra note 47. 
79 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 56. 
80 Jonathan Clough, A World of Difference: The Budapest Convention of Cybercrime and the 
Challenges of Harmonisation, 40 MONASH U. L. REV. 698, 700-01 (2014). 
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territory to the requesting country as long as the requested procedure can be taken by 
its national authority according to its procedural law. For example, if the requested 
country does not have the necessary procedural power for the expedited preservation of 
computer data, then it will refuse the request from the requesting state for such a 
measure through mutual legal assistance.81 
 
In fact, the inherent transnational nature of cybercrime as illustrated in chapter two82 
increases the need for such harmonisation more than other crimes that may also have a 
transnational dimension such as the human trafficking, smuggling of drugs, and money 
laundering. However, this does not mean that all cybercrime laws should be identical 
but what is required is some degree of harmonisation that enables international 
cooperation mechanisms between law enforcement authorities to work effectively.83 
 
Indeed, several international and supranational organizations to include, in particular, 
the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, and INTERPOL have recognized the 
inherent cross-border nature of cybercrime which requires an international 
harmonization of legal, technical, and other solutions. These organizations indeed have 
a great impact in building international awareness and cooperation in this respect.84  
 
Such efforts have resulted in the conclusion of several conventions including the 
Budapest Convention,85 the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal 
Data Protection,86 the Commonwealth of Independent States Agreement on 
Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information,87 the Arab 
convention,88 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement on Cooperation 
 
81 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 61. 
82 See discussion supra note 19. 
83 Jonathan Clough, supra note 80, at 700-01. 
84 Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, supra note 5, at 165. 
85 Convention on Cybercrime, surpa note 8. 
86  The African Union, African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection, June. 27, 2014. 
87 Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information, surpa 
note 56. 
88 Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses, supra note 9. 
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in the Field of International Information Security.89 Moreover, several relevant United 
Nations system decisions, resolutions, and recommendations have been issued in this 
regard such as General Assembly Resolutions 55/63 of December 4, 2000 90 and 56/121 
of December 19, 2001 91 on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information 
Technologies. Nevertheless, there is still an imperative need for a global multilateral 
treaty for combating cybercrime that can accomplish the harmonization among national 
substantive and procedural laws.92  
 
Besides the need for harmonization, there is an urgent necessity for an effective 
partnership between law enforcement authorities and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
in the private sector as they have played a crucial role in detecting, discovering, and 
proving the case against the offender(s) because the data is uploaded, transmitted or 
stored on their servers. Thus, such cooperation must secure the obtaining of valid data 
about the identification of offenders and their location.93  
 
Indeed, one of the most important tools regarding this cooperation is the 2019 Practical 
Guide for Requesting Electronic Evidence Across Borders which was issued by the 
United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime. It explains how law enforcement authorities 
around the world can request digital evidence from ISPs as well as contains the policies 
of several ISPs that show the rules which govern their cooperation with law 
enforcement authorities around the world.94 Nowadays, many ISPs accept the request 
for the preservation or emergency disclosure of data which comes directly from a 
foreign law enforcement authority without being transmitted through the competent 
national authority in the state where the ISP is located.95 
 
 
89  Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, surpa note 59. 
90 G.A. Res. 55/63, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/63 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
91 G.A. Res. 56/121, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/121 (Dec. 19, 2001). 
92 Ikenga K.E. Oraegbunam, surpa note 35, at 40. 
93 Cristos Velasco, Cybercrime jurisdiction: past, present and future, 16 ERA F. 331, 340 
(2015). 
94  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2019/January/unodc-and-partners-release-practical-
guide-for-requesting-electronic-evidence-across-boarders.html.  
95 Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, 
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/.  
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In addition, the national role is very important to support such international efforts as 
each state should establish a national well-specialized entity to deal with transnational 
issues of cybercrime and cooperate effectively with its counterparts throughout the 
world through the different forms of international cooperation.96 Furthermore, every 
state should develop its national laws, strategies, authorities, and abilities in the fight 
against cybercrime. The well-organized cooperation with the private sector and civil 
society at the national level and the coordination between the roles and efforts of 
governmental institutions are essential factors in countering cybercrime.97 
 
In sum, this chapter has shown the different forms of international cooperation against 
transnational cybercrime as well as the international and national efforts to promote 
such cooperation. The next chapter explains the different grounds for asserting criminal 
jurisdiction. Then, it illustrates how cybercrime characteristics have encouraged the 
application of an expansive approach in relation to jurisdiction over cybercrime which 
may lead to the situation of a positive conflict of jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 Abraham D. Sofaer & Seymour E. Goodman, supra note 4, at 3. 
97 David Satola & Henry L. Judy, Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing International 
Cooperation and Collaboration in Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: Reflections on the 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010 United Nations Internet 
Governance Forum, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1745, 1788 (2011). 
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IV. Jurisdiction over Cybercrime 
Actually, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction can be based on several grounds including 
territoriality, active personality, passive personality, protective, and universality 
principles that could lead to the situation of conflict of jurisdiction between states. This 
chapter starts with discussing in detail those different bases for the assertion of 
jurisdiction and their weight in the contemporary international law. Then, it shows how 
the features of cybercrime have led to the adoption of a broad approach to the exercise 
of jurisdiction which may result in the concurrent jurisdictional claims over the same 
cybercrime. 
 
A. Jurisdiction in International Law 
Traditionally, jurisdiction in international law is a central feature of principles of state 
sovereignty and equality of states. It can be defined as the power of a sovereign state to 
regulate or otherwise impact people, properties, and circumstances whether by 
legislation, executive decree, or the court’s judgment.98  
 
Historically, jurisdiction has been understood in reference to geographical borders since 
the emergence of the sovereign nation state and the exercise of jurisdiction over crimes 
occurring outside the state’s territory was seen as an exception to the rule. However, the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century has seen a dramatic rise in the commission 
of transnational organized crimes such as terrorism, cybercrime, and human trafficking. 
Hence, countries have become interested in criminal activity occurring outside their 
territory either because of the inability or unwillingness of another state to prosecute 
such serious crimes, or because it achieved some sort of domestic or foreign policy 
agenda. As a result, the international community has concluded several treaties that 
either require or allow extraterritorial jurisdiction over some types of criminal 
offences,99 as shown later in relation to cybercrime.100  
 
In general, under the customary international law, the territorial principle is regarded as 
the basic principle of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is also accepted that national law may 
 
98 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (8th ed. 2017).  
99  DANIELLE IRRELAND-PIPER, ACCOUNTABILITY IN EXTRATERRITORIALITY: A 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 3 (2017). 
100 See discussion infra notes 179, 180. 
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extend its jurisdiction over conduct that is committed outside the state’s physical 
territory based on one of the recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction: the 
active personality, passive personality, protective, and universality principles.101 
 
1. Territorial Principle 
The first ground for criminal jurisdiction is the territorial principle which is based on 
the location of a crime’s commission. Traditionally, this principle is the most common 
basis of jurisdiction over crimes and the countries impose their jurisdiction over the 
offenses committed in whole or in part within their territory.102 This principle is derived 
from state sovereignty and universally recognized without raising any controversy.103  
 
In fact, this principle depends on the absolute right of every state to impose its 
jurisdiction over all acts committed within its territory whether criminal or not as well 
as over all persons existing in such territory whether on land, sea, or the airspace above 
the land and sea territory.104 National criminal law is territorial in essence and based on 
the conception of law enforcement as a mean of keeping the peace and security within 
a state’s territory.105  
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the territorial doctrine has lost its primacy as the most 
common base for asserting jurisdiction due to several reasons. The first reason is that 
the contemporary developments in the era of international cooperation in criminal 
matters between states allow the conviction of an accused person for a crime committed 
outside state’s territory through the gathering of evidence from different foreign 
jurisdictions. Such developments undermine the argument that the territorial principle 
supports the common law principle of confrontation in criminal cases by ensuring that 
 
101  CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2d ed. 2015); see also 
DANIELLE IRRELAND-PIPER, supra note 99, at 2-3. 
102  Ray August, International Cyber-Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 
531, 536 (2002). 
103 ALINA KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 358 (5th ed. 2015). 
104 ANDERS HENRIKSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2d ed. 2019). 
105 Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 1109, 1114 (1982). 
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the perpetrator will be tried in the place of the crime’s commission where witnesses and 
evidence are more readily available.106 
 
The second reason is the sharp increase in the number of transnational crimes which 
pushes states to adopt several grounds to assert their jurisdiction in order to establish 
the criminal liability of the offenders according to their national laws.107 The third one 
is that the territorial borders between states have become less relevant, especially within 
the European Union where EU’s citizens are entitled by law to move easily within many 
countries without the need for the ordinary requirements such as a passport or Visa.108 
 
In reality, the application of the territorial principle may cause a practical problem when 
a crime is initiated or planned in one state but committed in another one. In fact, the 
international law has evolved two approaches to solve this dilemma which are the 
objective and subjective territorialities. The first one is based on the effect of the crime 
and emphasizes that a state will have jurisdiction over the crime that was executed on 
its territory even though some of its elements occurred abroad. The second one, which 
is of a great importance in countering the transnational crime like cybercrime, holds 
that a state has jurisdiction over all acts that are completed abroad as long as they are 
initiated or planned on its territory.109 
 
Relating to cybercrime, the national cybercrime laws impose their jurisdiction when all 
or part of the modus operandi of the offence occurs in the state territory. Also, at the 
international level, Article (22) of the Budapest Convention adopts the territorial 
doctrine as the primary basis for asserting jurisdiction over cybercrime.110 Later, the 
weight of territorial jurisdictional claim in relation to cybercrime will be assessed 
separately in chapter five.111 
 
 
106 P. Arnell, The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 955, 958-
59 (2001). 
107 See discussion supra note 99. 
108 P. Arnell, supra note 106, at 959. 
109 ANDERS HENRIKSEN, supra note 104, at 85-86. 
110 Convention on Cybercrime, surpa note 8, at 13. 
111 See discussion infra notes 249-254. 
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Actually, the application of the territorial principle in relation to cybercrime raises a 
very critical debate regarding whether the location of the cybercrime is the place of 
download, the place(s) of uploading or the place(s) through which the data is 
transported. For example, in LICRA V. Yahoo!,112 two civil organizations sued Yahoo, 
an American online service provider, in France for showing Nazi propaganda, 
memorabilia and objects available for purchase in the Yahoo French website which was 
illegal in France. The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris asserted its jurisdiction over 
Yahoo because the memorabilia and objects were available to residents located in 
France even though the data could also be uploaded from a place outside France and 
stored in Yahoo servers in the USA. Then, the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris 
ordered Yahoo to remove such content and destroy all the concerned files stored in its 
server. Therefore, this court considered the place of data download as the base for 
exercising the territorial jurisdiction over the involved cybercrime. 
 
2. Active Nationality Principle 
The second ground for asserting jurisdiction is the active nationality principle which is 
based on the nationality of the accused.113 Indeed, it is universally accepted that a state 
may prosecute its own national who has committed a crime abroad.114 States have an 
inherent right to apply its jurisdiction over their nationals even if all the elements of the 
crime were committed outside its territory.115  
 
In fact, the application of this principle is justified on several reasons. First, it is 
important to prevent the state’s national from circumventing his/her state’s law that 
forbids certain acts by committing them in other countries where such acts are legal.116 
Second, it is recognized that a sovereign state may legitimately impose obligations on 
its subjects because nationality is considered as the link between the state and its people 
which establishes rights and duties between nationals and their state that gives the latter 
 
112 Armando A. Cottim, Cybercrime, Cyber terrorism and Jurisdiction: An Analysis of Article 
22 of the COE Convention on Cybercrime, 2 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 55, 67-68 (2010). 
113  REBECCA M.M. WALLACE & OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (6th ed. 
2009). 
114 ALINA KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 103, at 360. 
115 MARTIN DIXON ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (6th ed.  2016). 
116 ADEMOLA ABASS, COMPLETE INTERNATIONAL LAW 536 (2012). 
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the right to assert jurisdiction over its nationals for acts committed inside or outside its 
territory.117 
 
The third ground is the principle of allegiance which each person owes to his/her state 
of nationality that entitles this state to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime committed 
everywhere by this person.118 Fourth, many states, especially civil law countries, do not 
extradite their own nationals who commit a crime abroad to the country where the crime 
was committed. Therefore, the asserting of jurisdiction by the state of nationality is 
needed to prevent the criminal from escaping prosecution.119 In such cases, the 
territorial state may welcome the exercise of jurisdiction by the state of nationality to 
ensure the prosecution of the criminal. In this way, this principle may decrease rather 
than increase international conflict between states in such situation.120 
 
In reality, active nationality principle is universally acknowledged. However, it is used 
more extensively by civil law than common law countries which restrict its application 
to the more serious crimes. For example, the UK’s application of this principle is 
restricted to several serious crimes such as sexual offences and murder. Similarly, the 
USA limits its exercise to certain crimes such as drug trafficking, treason, and crimes 
by or against the armed forces.121 One example of the application of the nationality 
principle is found in R. V. Earl Russell,122 A national of the UK was convicted of bigamy 
although the second act of marriage took place outside the UK and the court asserted 
its jurisdiction based upon his British nationality. Thus, the court exercised its 
jurisdiction over the illegal act upon the existence of active nationality principle as a 
ground for asserting jurisdiction. 
 
Sometimes, the state’s law conditions the application of the nationality principle on the 
return of the offender to his/her state of nationality and the requirement that the act 
which was committed abroad is also criminalized according to the law of the country 
 
117  GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 255 (2012). 
118 ALINA KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, supra note 103, at 360. 
119 Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, The Nationality of the Offender and the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 609 (2001). 
120 CEDRIC RYNGAERT, supra note 101, at 106-07. 
121 REBECCA M.M. WALLACE & OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA, supra note 113, at 124-25. 
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where it occurred.123 For example, Article (3) of the Egyptian Penal Code states that 
“any Egyptian committing abroad a deed considered to be a felony or misdemeanor 
under the present law, shall be liable to punishment by virtue of its provisions if he/she 
returns to the country and the deed is punishable by virtue of the law of the country 
where it is committed”.124 
 
Nevertheless, the exercise of the nationality principle may cause an overlap of 
jurisdiction between the state of a defendant’s nationality and the territorial state where 
the crime was committed. In such case, the state of nationality will assert its jurisdiction 
because the offender holds its own nationality. Therefore, it will refuse the extradition 
based on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare which allows the state of nationality 
to refrain from extraditing its own national provided that it refers the case to its own 
competent authorities without delay. On the other hand, the territorial state will also 
claim its jurisdiction because it believes that it has the closest link to the crime which 
was committed in its own land where the witnesses, victims, and evidence exist. Thus, 
the exercise of jurisdiction is a sort of sovereignty over its own territory.125 Indeed, this 
conflict needs to be resolved by obvious rules that will be discussed later in this study.126 
 
One well-known example of such a conflict is the Lockerbie case.127 In 1988, a plane, 
registered in the USA, exploded over Scotland which resulted in the killing of all 
passengers and crew as well as persons on the ground in the town of Lockerbie. The 
victims were of 21 different nationalities but mainly from the USA and UK. Later, two 
Libyan nationals were accused of planting the bomb on board the plane. Nevertheless, 
Libya refused their extradition due to their Libyan nationality and requested all related 
evidence to be used in its own judicial investigation based on Article (7) of  Montreal 
Aircraft Sabotage Convention which established the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare.128 While, the USA and the UK primarily claimed their jurisdiction based upon 
 
123 ADEMOLA ABASS, supra note 116, at 536. 
124 Law No. 58 of 1997 (criminal code), Al-Waqa’I’ al-Misriyah, 5 Aug. 1937, No. 71, pp.  58-
87 (Egypt). 
125 ANDERS HENRIKSEN, supra note 104, at 92. 
126 See discussion infra Ch. 5. 
127 DANIELLE IRRELAND-PIPER, supra note 99, at 17. 
128 International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 128, Sep. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S 177 (entered into force 
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the territorial principle. After a long negotiation, it was agreed that a trial would be held 
in the Netherlands in a court deemed to be a Scottish court. In this way, this conflict 
between the competing states over jurisdiction was resolved by reaching a compromise 
solution. 
 
Regarding cybercrime, most national laws assert jurisdiction if the crime is committed 
by one of the state’s nationals. Examples are Article (3) of Egyptian Law,129 Article 
(33) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act of 2015,130 and Article (27) of Cybercrime Law of 
Portugal No. 109 for the year of 2009.131 Also, in the international sphere, Article (22) 
of the Budapest Convention provides for the nationality principle as a ground for 
jurisdiction.132 Finally, the nationality principle is applicable to natural persons as well 
as to juristic persons. Therefore, the service providers being adhering to the territorial 
principle, may also be subject to the nationality principle in relation to obligation and 
wrongful acts.133 
 
3. Passive Nationality Principle 
The third base for exercising jurisdiction is the passive nationality principle which is 
based on the nationality of the victim. This ground gives a state the jurisdiction to 
prosecute and adjudicate a foreigner irrespective of his/her nationality for a crime he/she 
committed outside its territory against its national(s).134 Indeed, many countries seek to 
protect its nationals abroad against serious crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking, 
and cybercrime by applying their laws on the perpetrators of these crimes committed 
outside local territories against their nationals.  
 
Historically, the application of this principle has been criticized and objected to for 
several reasons. First, it is not accepted because the interest of the state to punish the 
offenders who committed a crime against their nationals abroad was not seen as an 
 
129 Egyptian Anti-Information Technology Crimes Law, supra note 77, art. 3. 
130 Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc.) Act (2015), (Nigeria) [hereinafter Nigerian Law 
on Cybercrime].  
131 Law No. 109 of 2009 (Law on Cybercrime), 15 Sept. 2009 (Portugal) [hereinafter Portuguese 
Law on Cybercrime]. 
132 Convention on Cybercrime, Surpa note 8, at 13. 
133 Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States 
May Regulate the Internet, 50 Fed. Comm. L.J. 117, 132 (1997). 
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essential one or an extension of the statehood. Second, state’ nationals enjoy the 
protection of the territorial state and the exercise of jurisdiction based on the passive 
nationality principle means that the territorial state is not able to protect all its 
inhabitants, including foreign nationals which was not accepted.135 
 
Third, this principle creates uncertainty about the acts that are considered legal within 
a state because a person may be held liable in a foreign state for an act committed against 
one of its nationals even though this act was not illegal in the state where it occurred. 
Fourth, the potential offender will not be able to predict which state’ laws he may be 
subjected to as he does not usually know the nationality of victim(s).136 
 
Fifth, this principle could cause an extensive tension between the concerned states when 
the act which is a crime under the law of the state of the victim’s nationality is not 
criminalized under the law of the state where it occurred or the state’s law of the 
perpetrator’s nationality. Sixth, the practical effect of the application of the passive 
personality rule is that a person will have the protection of the law of his/her 
nationality’s state wherever he/she exists. Therefore, all persons who have contacted 
with him/her are themselves subject to this law.137 
 
There are many examples that reflect such opposition to the passive nationality 
principle. In the S.S ‘Lotus’ France v. Turkey, all of the dissenting judges expressly 
rejected the application of this principle.138 Also, in the Cutting Case Mexico v. USA,139 
a U.S. citizen has charged with a libel against a Mexican national in the USA. He was 
arrested during a trip to Mexico upon the application of the passive nationality principle. 
As a result, the USA Government strongly protested Mexico’s exercise of its 
jurisdiction based on this principle. In addition, the commentary on Article (10) of the 
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime reveals opposition to this 
principle as a basis for jurisdiction because it is considered to cause controversy without 
serving any useful objective.140 
 
135 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 239 (1995).  
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Due to the increase in terrorist attacks and other internationally condemned crimes, 
nowadays, there is less rejection for the passive personality principle as an accepted 
ground for jurisdiction. In reality, there are several examples that prove the positive 
tendency for the application of this principle. In US v. Yunis, US agents arrested a 
Lebanese citizen in international water and brought him for prosecution in the USA for 
alleged involvement in the hijacking of a Jordanian aircraft. In this case, U.S Court 
based its jurisdiction upon the universality principle and the passive personality 
principle because there were several American nationals on that flight.141 Another 
instance is when U.S authorities relied on this principle in 1985 to prosecute a group of 
terrorists who had hijacked an Italian cruise ship called the Achille Lauro and murdered 
an American passenger.142 
 
In relation to cybercrime, many national laws extend their jurisdiction to cover the 
cybercrime that is committed against their national(s) outside national territories. For 
example, Article (3) of Egyptian Law,143 Article (33) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 
of 1995.144 Nevertheless, the increased use of this principle results in a situation of 
concurrent jurisdictions over the same cybercrime that will be discussed later in chapter 
five.145  
 
4. Protective Principle 
The fourth basis for jurisdiction is the protective principle which is based on the 
protection of essential interests of a state. Traditionally, it has been recognized that 
states have a legitimate interest in safeguarding their vital national interests such as 
national security and economy against certain crimes like espionage, the falsification of 
official documents, cybercrime, and different forms of transnational organized crimes 
which are committed abroad by subjecting the offenders of those crimes to their national 
law. However, the list of the essential interests is not limited and may differ from one 
state to another .i.e. certain interests may be important for one country whereas not 
 
141 MALCOLM N. SHAW, supra note 98, at 498. 
142 ANDERS HENRIKSEN, supra note 104, at 88. 
143 Egyptian Anti-Information Technology Crimes Law, supra note 77, art. 3. 
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being as such for another country.146 Nevertheless, there is a great uncertainty regarding 
crimes that are covered by this principle i.e. what crimes are subject to a state’s 
jurisdiction even if committed outside its boundaries by foreigners.147 
 
Indeed, the American law has traditionally provided for the extension of jurisdiction 
over certain offenses when the conduct has been committed abroad as long as the 
harmful effect or result occurred within the USA' territorial boundaries.148 For example, 
in United States v. Zehe,149 it was held that the USA had the jurisdiction over the alleged 
act of espionage which was committed in Mexico and the German Democratic Republic 
by an East German citizen against the USA. Such an assertion of jurisdiction was based 
on the protective principle which allowed the USA to impose its jurisdiction over the 
act committed abroad either by its own nationals or foreigners which threatened its 
security. 
 
There are two main arguments in favor of the development of this principle in the 
international law as an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial or 
nationality state. First, all states have such interests and seek to maintain their power to 
protect them so that they are ready to give up their power as a territorial state or a state 
of nationality on a reciprocal basis if another state claims its jurisdiction based on the 
protective principle. Second, the territorial state and the state of nationality could have 
no interest in prosecuting such crimes or the ability to do so effectively. Therefore, the 
effected state has a legitimate interest in prosecuting them otherwise they could go 
unpunished.150 Indeed, this principle can achieve a legitimate interest of a state to 
counter crimes committed by aliens abroad which have an adverse effect on its security 
and welfare. Therefore, it is regarded as an accepted basis of jurisdiction under the 
customary international law.151  
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There is always the risk that some states may abuse this principle by applying a very 
broad interpretation of this doctrine by expanding their jurisdiction to protect an unvital 
interest.152 There is also a danger that this principle may be used by one state to punish 
acts committed abroad which are protected as civil freedoms by the state within its 
territory these acts occurred such as the freedom of press and speech.153 
 
In addition, the application of this principle can cause a practical problem if the act 
committed abroad is a crime under the law of the state against its interest this act was 
committed but is not illegal under the law of the state where it occurred. Thus, it has 
been suggested that this principle should not be applied if the act is lawful under the 
law of the state where it took place in order to avoid unnecessary tension between the 
concerned states.154 Furthermore, the extensive utilization of this principle will 
definitely lead to a conflict of jurisdiction between states which will be discussed later 
in chapter five.155 
 
Regarding cybercrime, many national laws extend their jurisdiction over cybercrime 
committed abroad when it targets computer systems located within their territories. 
Examples are Article (3) of Egyptian Law,156 Article (47) of the Emirati Anti-
Information Technology Crimes Law No. 5 for the year of 2012,157 and Article (2) of 
the Electronic Information and Transactions Law of Indonesia No. 11 of 2008.158 
 
Also, there are several examples that prove the positive tendency for the application of 
this principle in relation to cybercrime, In the Ttiben case,159 one Australian national 
posted material on a web site that denied the existence of the Holocaust. He was charged 
with inciting racial hatred by a German Court that assumed jurisdiction on the basis of 
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the protective principle to protect a legitimate national interest which is a segment of 
the national population from being defamed. 
 
5. Universality Principle 
The fifth and final basis for jurisdiction is the universality principle which is based on 
the international character of the offense that allows a state’s judicial system to 
prosecute and adjudicate an offender of a  jus cogens crime such as piracy and genocide 
even though there is no connection between this state and the committed crime.160 That 
is because these crimes are so serious and disruptive to the international community that 
any state can exercise its jurisdiction over them irrespective of where they have been 
committed or the nationality of the offenders or victims.161  
 
Therefore, the application of universal jurisdiction is the most efficient way to counter 
and prevent international crimes by raising the possibility of prosecution and 
punishment of offenders.162 To such effect, many states such as Belgium and Spain have 
issued national legislation which explicitly establishes their universal jurisdiction over 
certain crimes.163 
 
Historically, the notion of universal jurisdiction was developed to counter the crime of 
piracy because the pirates commonly roamed the high seas outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any state which is not regulated by the national laws. Therefore, the 
universal jurisdiction was created to fulfil the jurisdictional vacuum by allowing all 
states to prosecute any pirate they could apprehend and the international customary law 
confirmed the states’ right to assert their jurisdiction over this crime.164 Then, the 
application of universal jurisdiction was extended to cover other jus cogens crimes to 
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include slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture, and 
apartheid.165 
 
However, it is strongly recommended that the application of universal jurisdiction must 
be controlled. Otherwise, it will be destructive to the international legal processes and 
would produce continuous conflicts of jurisdiction between states that may threaten the 
world order and subject individuals to human rights violations, politically motivated 
harassment, and abuses of judicial processes. Therefore, it is inevitable to develop 
guidelines regulating the resort by states and international adjudicating bodies to the 
application of this principle. Then, such guidelines, after acquiring the required 
international consensus, should be reflected in an international convention.166  
 
In reality, one of the most important cases that involves the application of this principle 
is Democratic of the Congo. V. Belgium.167 When Belgium issued an international arrest 
warrant against the acting Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs due to his grave 
violation of international humanitarian law and based the assertion of its jurisdiction on 
the universal principle as there was no connection between Belgium and this crime.  
 
In relation to cybercrime, it is argued that the universal jurisdiction which allows one 
state to prosecute certain crimes even in the absence of any connection should be 
extended to cover cybercrime. Thus, such application can solve the inherent 
jurisdictional problems associated with the commission of cybercrime to include where 
the crime occurred, who will investigate it, and where the crime will be prosecuted. 
Also, this principle is suited to the transnational nature of cybercrime as the offender 
can commit a cybercrime which causes damage to victims in more than one country. 
Even though, such opinion recognizes that it is still unclear as to what extent the 
universal jurisdiction should apply to cybercrime.168 On the contrary, it is contended 
that cybercrime can not be subjected to the universal jurisdiction unless it causes a vital 
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violation of human rights that constitutes one of the heinous international crimes such 
as crime against humanity.169 
 
Similarly, in relation to a cyberterrorism crime that can be defined as the use of 
computer technology to commit a terrorist act,170 there is a view that universal 
jurisdiction has a broad reach as it gives a state authority the power to prosecute certain 
international crimes even though no connection exists. Therefore, this principle is the 
most effective method for deterring cyberterrorism crimes by defeating the inherent 
practical challenges resulted from those terrorists committing their crimes in cyberspace 
with the aim of establishing their accountability in order to enhance international peace 
and justice.171 
 
In fact, there are several arguments in favor of such application. First, cyberterrorism 
crime imposes several practical difficulties for law enforcement authorities in the 
investigation and prosecution process especially the difficulty in knowing the identity 
of cyberterrorist or the location of computer used to launch the attack. Hence, such 
obstacles make it difficult to apply territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the application of 
universal jurisdiction that does not require any connection between the state and the 
crime can overcome these challenges so that it is the most effective mean to deter a 
cyberterrorist crime.172 Second, the heinous nature of this crime is equivalent to the core 
international crimes like genocide and crimes against humanity which are subject to 
universal jurisdiction.173 Thus, cyberterrorism as well should subject to the universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
Third, the customary international law recognizes terrorism and subsequently 
cyberterrorism as an international crime that could subject to universal jurisdiction. That 
is proved by state practice and opinio juris as states believe that terrorism is a heinous 
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crime against humanity and the international order which is reflected in the conclusion 
of nineteen international legal instruments to prevent terrorism acts.174 As well, there 
are several resolutions issued from the United Nation Security Council and General 
Assembly that condemn terrorist acts especially those committed through or by the 
Internet and states are called upon to enhance the international cooperation in this 
respect. As a result, states and international organizations are actively working to 
implement these resolutions which confirms the existence of both opinio juris and state 
practice.175 
 
I agree with the opinion adopted by several experts who confirm that terrorism is a 
transnational but not an international crime for several reasons. First, all the 
international instruments in relation to terrorism do not provide for universal 
jurisdiction over any form of terrorist act but only require states to criminalize certain 
conducts, establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over them, and cooperate with each other 
in the prosecution and extradition of the offenders. Second, countries refused the 
proposal to include terrorism as a separate crime under the Rome Statute which 
established and governs the International Criminal Court. Third, there is no universally 
accepted definition of terrorism and all efforts to establish such a definition have been 
failed.176 For all of these reasons, I contend that terrorism is not one of the international 
crimes. 
 
However, many authors contend that there is a universal definition of terrorism as an 
international crime in the time of peace which has evolved via international customary 
law. Regardless, they admit that there is still controversy over whether the definition 
may also be applied in time of armed conflict due to the disagreement in relation to 
whether acts performed by freedom fighters' in wars of national liberation may (or 
should) constitute an exception and not be considered as a terrorism crime.177 
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B. The Expansive Jurisdiction Approach over Cybercrime 
After elaborating the different bases for exercising the criminal jurisdiction by the 
states, this section shows how law reforms have expanded territorial jurisdiction and 
established extraterritorial jurisdiction as a policy response to the cybercrime 
phenomenon and its transnational dimension.178 Indeed, the drafters of several national 
laws and international or regional cybercrime instruments adopt a broad approach in 
relation to the jurisdiction over this crime. As a result, jurisdiction over cybercrime can 
be established based on several bases including territorial, active nationality, passive 
nationality, and protective principles. 
 
At the international level, one of the main objectives of the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and other cybercrime’ conventions is to make sure that 
there is no safe haven for the criminal and ensure that every illegal action will be 
adjudicated. Therefore, most of these conventions provide for an expansive approach 
in relation to the jurisdiction.  
 
For example, according to Article (30) of the Arab Convention,179 state party shall 
commit itself to adopting the procedures necessary to extend its competence to any of 
the offences set forth in this Convention, if the offence is committed, partly or totally, 
or was realized: 
• In the territory of the state party.  
• On board a ship raising the flag of the State Party.  
• On board a plane registered under the law of the State Party.  
• By a national of the State Party if the offence is punishable according to the 
domestic law in the location where it was committed, or if it was committed 
outside the jurisdiction of any State.  
• If the offence affects an overriding interest of the State. 
 
Another instance, according to Article (22) of the Budapest Convention,180 each state 
party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish 
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jurisdiction over any offence set forth in this Convention, when the offence is 
committed: 
• In its territory.  
• On board a ship flying the flag of that Party. 
• On board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party. 
• By one of its nationals if the offence is punishable under criminal law where 
it was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any State.  
 
Likewise, at the national level, several countries have responded to the challenge of 
transnational cybercrime by expanding their jurisdiction over this crime.181 For 
example, Article (3) of the Egyptian Law adopts the territorial, active nationality, 
passive nationality, and protective principles as bases to establish jurisdiction over any 
cybercrime.182 In fact, the Egyptian legislator adopts the same approach in relation to 
crimes that could be associated with a transnational dimension such as Article (16) of 
Combating Human Trafficking Law,183Article (20) of Combating Illegal Migration and 
Smuggling of Migrants Law,184and Article (4) of Anti-Terrorism Law.185 Also, the 
Article (47) of the Emirati Anti-Information Technology Crimes Law No. 5 for the year 
of 2012,186and the Article (27) of the Cybercrime Law of Portugal No. 109 for the year 
of 2009,187adopt the same grounds as Egyptian law in terms of jurisdictional bases over 
cybercrime. 
 
C. Conflict of Jurisdiction in Cybercrime 
In fact, this previously mentioned expansive approach to exercising jurisdiction over 
cybercrime can lead to the situation whereby two or more countries assert their 
jurisdiction based on the application of either similar or different jurisdictional claims 
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over the same cybercrime. Then, they initiate parallel proceedings for the same facts 
that lead to a positive jurisdictional conflict between them.188  
 
Unlike the positive conflict of jurisdiction, the negative conflict may occur when no 
country claims its jurisdiction over a certain cybercrime. In reality, this situation is very 
rare due to the increased number of international and regional cybercrime agreements 
which oblige the state members to criminalize different forms of cybercrime.189 
Subsequently, most of the countries around the world have now a legislation against 
cybercrime.190 
 
One example of positive conflict of jurisdiction over the same cybercrime is if one 
person in the United Arab Emirates spread a serious virus on the Internet which caused 
massive harm to many Egyptian and Nigerian nationals in the United Arab Emirates 
and governmental institutions in several countries, including Singapore and Portugal. 
Each country would claim its jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate this 
crime according to the jurisdiction clause in its domestic law. Indeed, the United Arab 
Emirates has a jurisdiction clause based on the territorial principle, whereas, Egypt and 
Nigeria have jurisdiction based on the passive nationality principle. One the other hand, 
Singapore and Portugal have a jurisdiction according to the protective principle. 
Therefore, there will be a positive conflict of jurisdiction between several states over 
the same cybercrime and the critical question here is how to resolve this conflict. 
 
Indeed, the drafters of several international conventions include a broad jurisdiction 
clause aiming at denying safe havens for criminals while recognizing the possibility of 
jurisdiction clash as a result of such an expansive clause. Nevertheless, they believe that 
this situation is rare and can be resolved through the negotiation between the concerned 
states in order to determine the best jurisdiction for the successful prosecution and 
adjudication of a particular case.191 
 
188 IAN WALDEN, supra note 178, at 306. 
189 Henrik W.K. Kaspersen, Cybercrime and internet jurisdiction 1, 6 (2009),   
https://rm.coe.int/16803042b7. 
190  Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, 4 J. High 
Tech. L. 1, 40 (2004). 
191 Roger S. Clark, The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 50 
Wayne L. Rev. 161, 181 (2004). 
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However, this conflict in reality raises many practical issues including the impediment 
of effective and rapid international cooperation between the competing states. This is 
particularly true in relation to extradition and mutual legal assistance requests as each 
concerned state will claim its jurisdiction over the crime and reject the jurisdiction of 
other states. Thus, a state will refuse to provide its assistance either through mutual legal 
assistance or extradition.192 Moreover, the issue is even more sophisticated if the 
perpetrator exists in a country with no jurisdictional claim and all the concerned states 
ask for the extradition or seek mutual legal assistance from this country. For example, 
in the pre-mentioned hypothetical case, if the accused person fled the United Arab 
Emirates to Kuwait, a very critical situation regarding to which country the accused 
person should be extradited to would result. 
 
Also, this conflict could lead to the violation of the non bis in idem principle that does 
not allow an alleged perpetrator to be prosecuted and punished more than one time for 
the same criminal act as the duplication of procedures and penalties involves the 
unacceptable repetition of the exercise of the ius puniendi.193 Indeed, the principle of 
ne bis in idem is a basic principle of the European and international criminal justice as 
well as national criminal law. For example, Article (14/7) of International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that “No one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again for an offense for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country”.194 
Furthermore, such conflict may result in inconvenience for witnesses, the duplication 
of efforts, or competition between law enforcement officials of the states concerned 
which should be avoided.195 
 
Therefore, it is a must to find a solution to such situations of concurrent jurisdictional 
claims by deciding which country should be given the exclusive right to prosecute and 
adjudicate the involved cybercrime. It is not an easy task to reach such an outcome for 
 
192 Henrik W.K. Kaspersen, supra note 189, at 6. 
193 Wolfgang Schomburg, Criminal matters: transnational ne bis in idem in Europe—conflict 
of jurisdictions—transfer of proceedings, 13 ERA F. 311, 312 (2012). 
194 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 177, Dec. 19, 1966, 1057 U.N.T.S 407 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
195 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 73, at 41.  
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several reasons. Firstly, it is recognized that each state has the sovereign power to 
impose its jurisdiction over conducts occurring within its territory and, beyond it, such 
other conducts which affect its legitimate interests.196 Secondly, the international law 
recognizes the equality between all states in the world and does not give any of them a 
hierarchical authority over the others.197 Thirdly, the general international law has not 
established a system of priority among different jurisdictional bases.198 Fourthly, the 
principles of jurisdiction under the international law do not resolve such dilemma of 
concurrent jurisdictional claims.199 
 
Indeed, some scholars suggest a specific hierarchy among the different jurisdictional 
theories in the situation of positive conflict of jurisdiction by giving the first priority to 
the territorial principle over other jurisdictional claims. Then, the universality principle, 
the protective theory, the active nationality principle, and finally, the passive nationality 
principle. Nevertheless, they confirm that there is still no clear rule which establishes 
such a hierarchy in the international law in the case of concurrent jurisdictional 
claims.200  
 
In addition, at the national level, countries have confirmed that, during the information 
gathering stage for the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime’s Comprehensive 
Study, they did not have specific legislation intended to resolve conflict of jurisdiction 
in cybercrime.201 
 
In sum, this chapter has represented in detail the different bases for jurisdiction and their 
value in the contemporary international law and how the main characteristics of 
cybercrime have encouraged the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction over this 
crime that may result in the occurrence of a positive conflict of jurisdiction. However, 
there is no conclusive agreement on one effective solution to positive jurisdiction’s 
conflict among states in cybercrimes cases either in the international instruments or in 
 
196 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdiction and Their Application in Extradition Law and 
Practice, 5 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 1, 2 (1974). 
197 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (2003). 
198 Roger S. Clark, supra note 191, at 181; see also ANDERS HENRIKSEN, supra note 104, at 92. 
199 DANIELLE IRRELAND-PIPER, supra note 99, at 2. 
200 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 196, at 59-60. 
201 Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, supra note 2, at 195. 
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the literature. The next chapter demonstrates the different opinions offered for solving 
the issue of competing jurisdictional claims over the same cybercrime. It concludes with 
suggestion for reaching a decision which can solve such a conflict.   
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V. Moving Forward to Overcome Conflict of Jurisdiction in Cybercrime 
It a must to set up an effective mechanism in order to resolve this conflict of jurisdiction 
arises in relation to cybercrime. This chapter shows in detail the different approaches to 
managing this conflict in order to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each 
view. In fact, these approaches include the opinion which favors the negotiation 
between the concerned states aiming at centralizing the criminal proceeding in one 
single country; the view that prefers the establishment of an obvious, concrete, and 
binding rule which decides the priority among the competing jurisdictional claims; and 
the opinion which supports the development of a guideline which includes certain 
factors to be evaluated in order to reach a decision settling this conflict. This chapter 
then proposes a solution by providing for certain factors with different weight to be 
assessed and evaluated in order to decide the best jurisdiction among the concurrent 
ones for being granted the exclusive competence over the cybercrime taking into 
consideration the characteristics of cybercrime and the facts of each single case. 
 
A. Evaluating Different Approaches Regarding the Positive Conflict of Jurisdiction 
In general, regarding civil and commercial matters, the international community 
especially the European Union has established an almost complete set of regulations on 
jurisdiction that provides the different parties with the ability to know in advance 
whether a specific court has or does not have the authority to decide the case brought 
before it with very little space for uncertainty and incoherence. Conversely, in criminal 
issues there is no set of agreed rules to decide which country should be given the 
jurisdiction over a crime in situation of a positive conflict even within the United 
Nations or European Union legal systems.202 
 
Moving to cybercrime, the same dilemma exists when there is a conflict over 
competence between two or more countries. Looking at the literature, it appears that 
there is an obvious recognition of the serious consequences in the case of concurrent 
jurisdictional claims which may affect negatively international cooperation in the fight 
against cybercrime and cause the violation of the fundamental principle of ne bis in 
idem. Such a conflict should be avoided in the interest of justice by choosing the best 
 
202 Ignazio Patrone, Conflicts of jurisdiction and judicial cooperation instruments: Eurojust’s 
role, 14 ERA F.  215, 216 (2013). 
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jurisdiction in a transparent and objective way in order to improve the judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.203 In addition, it is a must to reach a solution to such a 
conflict at the very beginning of the criminal proceedings because it is clearly 
inadequate when a judge decides that he has no jurisdiction relating to a certain crime 
after a long and complicated investigation.204 
 
Nevertheless, there is no conclusive agreement on one agreed solution to such a positive 
conflict of jurisdiction. Looking at the literature, there are three different ways to deal 
with such a dilemma. The first opinion confirms that since the general international law 
has not established a system of priority among different jurisdictional theories. 
Therefore, in the case of competing jurisdictional claims between two or more states 
the best solution is conducting a fruitful negotiation between the concerned states in 
order to decide the best state jurisdiction for a successful prosecution and adjudication 
of the involved case.205 
 
In reality, such a position is adopted in many international instruments. For example, 
Article (15/5) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime provides that “if a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 
of this Article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other States 
Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of 
the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, 
consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.”206 In such way, this 
Article encourages the negotiation and coordination between states parties in the case 
of positive conflict of jurisdiction. 
 
The same position is adopted in Article (22/5) of the Budapest Convention which 
provides that “when more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offense 
established in accordance with this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where 
 
203  Aghenitei Mihaela & Flamanzeanu Ion, Analysis Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal 
Proceedings to the European Union Legal Framework, 2010 AGORA Int'l J. Jurid. Sci. [cxlv], 
[cxlix] (2010). 
204 Ignazio Patrone, supra note 202, at 217. 
205 Roger S. Clark, supra note 191, at 181. 
206 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 17, at 16. 
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appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.”207  
 
Indeed, the proponents of such a view allege that such negotiation has many advantages 
as it allows the concerned states to choose a single venue for legal proceedings or to 
authorize one state to prosecute certain perpetrators and another state to prosecute 
another group of alleged offenders if such a solution is the most appropriate one for the 
interest of the legal proceedings against the committed crime.208 In addition, I argue that 
such negotiation may effectively encourage the implementation of the different forms 
of international cooperation especially the establishment of joint investigation team 
between the authorities of the concerned states which can deal effectively with a 
cybercrime that has a transnational nature in terms of the collection of evidence and 
apprehension of the offenders. 
 
Furthermore, supporters to this opinion confirm that the agreement resulting from the 
consultation and negotiation between the involved states can be legally implemented by 
resorting to the mechanism of transferring of criminal proceedings commenced in one 
country to be conducted in another state.209 For example, according to Article (3) of the 
European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters “Any 
Contracting State having competence under its own law to prosecute an offense may, 
for the purposes of applying this Convention, waive or desist from proceedings against 
a suspected person who is being or will be prosecuted for the same offense by another 
Contracting State.”210 
 
In contrast, many authors argue that there are many disadvantages linked to this opinion 
that prefers the negotiation as a mean to settle this conflict of jurisdiction. First, it merely 
encourages the concerned states to solve the dilemma of dispute over jurisdiction 
 
207 Convention on Cybercrime, surpa note 8, at 14. 
208 Armando A. Cottim, supra note 112, at 67; see also Explanatory Report to the Convention 
on Cybercrime, supra note 73, at 41. 
209 IAN WALDEN, supra note 178, at 307; see also United Nation Manual on the prevention and 
control of computer- related crime, 25 (2001), 
 http://216.55.97.163/wp-
content/themes/bcb/bdf/int_regulations/un/CompCrims_UN_Guide.pdf. 
210 Council of Europe, European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 
2, May. 15, 1972, E.T.S No. 073 (entered into force Mar. 30, 1978). 
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through consultation and mutual agreement which is rare in practice without providing 
the states with concrete guidelines setting up a mechanism for prioritizing jurisdictional 
claims. This mechanism establishes certain factors to be considered in reaching a 
decision solving such conflict. Second, as long as the conflict of states’ jurisdictions 
becomes more common, negotiation is likely to be less satisfactory because it does not 
provide the involved states with the ability to predict the outcome and it is time-
consuming.211 
 
Third, according to the Explanatory Report of the Budapest Convention, consultation is 
not obligatory. Thus, if a state believes that consultation may impair or delay its 
investigation or proceedings, it may refuse to conduct any consultation with the other 
state(s).212 The Budapest Convention is criticized because it does not establish an 
effective mean for resolving the possible positive conflict of jurisdiction either by 
determining certain and clear guidelines or setting up a mechanism for prioritizing 
jurisdictional claims.213 For all of these reasons, the only dependence on the negotiation 
is not suitable to settle this dilemma. 
 
Unlike the first approach, the second opinion contends that the most effective solution 
to such conflict is to establish an obvious, concrete, and binding rule which determines 
the priority among the competing national jurisdictional theories.214 Such a position is 
followed by Article (30/3) of the League of Arab States Convention, which provides 
for an explicit order of priority for competing jurisdictional claims as follows: (i) states 
whose security or interests have been disrupted by the offense; (ii) states in whose 
territory the offense was committed; and (iii) the state of nationality of the offender. If 
no balance can be found according to this order, then priority is accorded to the first 
requesting state.215  
 
 
211 Susan W. Brenner, supra note 37, at 197. 
212 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 73, at 41. 
213 Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, supra note 190, at 42.  
214 Shannon L. Hopkins, Cybercrime Convention: A Positive Beginning to a Long Road Ahead, 
2 J. High Tech. L. 101, 118 (2003); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 196, at 61. 
215 Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses, supra note 9, at 15. 
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Also, Article (10) of EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against 
information systems216 allows each member state to establish its jurisdiction if the 
offence has been committed in whole or in part within its territory, by one of its 
nationals, or for the benefit of a legal person that has its head office in its territory, or 
against an information system on its territory whether or not the offender committed the 
crime when physically present on its territory. In the case of concurrent jurisdiction 
claims, the concerned states must cooperate to centralize the proceedings in one state. 
Also, they may recourse to a body or mechanism within the EU to facilitate their judicial 
cooperation and sequential account may be given first to the state where the crime has 
been committed or against an information system in its territory; then, the state of the 
perpetrator nationality; after that, the state in which the perpetrator has been found. 
 
In fact, this opinion is criticized because it is not an easy task to establish a hierarchy 
among different jurisdictional bases. Furthermore, such a rule is very rigid which cannot 
accommodate with the circumstances and particularities of each case. The 
determination on which jurisdiction is the best venue to investigate and prosecute 
should be based on the facts and circumstances of every single case.217 Thus, I agree 
that this approach is not adequate for deciding in advance the best jurisdiction for the 
trial and is not suitable to the uniqueness of a particular case of cybercrime. 
 
The third approach argues that there should be a guideline which determines certain 
factors to be considered in order to reach a decision solving such positive conflict of 
jurisdiction between countries. In addition, the supporters of such opinion allege that 
these factors are not necessary to be given equal weight, are not intended to be 
exhaustive, and should serve as elements that structure the general assessment of 
whether it is “reasonable” to assign the jurisdiction to Country A, Country B or Country 
C in a particular case. In addition, the proponents of such view contend that these factors 
will not only help in giving a solution to the dilemma, but also providing the states with 
the ability to predict the outcome if the dispute over jurisdiction exists aiming at 
preventing the conflict at the very beginning or before its occurrence.218 
 
216 EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, art. 10/4, 2005 O.J. (L 69/67). 
217 United Nation Manual on the prevention and control of computer- related crime, supra note 
209, at 26; see also Susan W. Brenner, supra note 37, at 198. 
218 Susan W. Brenner, supra note 37, at 197-98. 
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In reality, The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) adopts such an 
opinion as according to Article (7) of the Eurojust decision 2009/426/JHA on the 
strengthening of Eurojust which amends decision 2002/187/JHA that setting up 
Eurojust, where two or more national members cannot agree on how to resolve a case 
of conflict of jurisdiction as regards the undertaking of investigations or prosecution, 
the Eurojust shall be asked to issue a written non-binding opinion on the case to the 
member states concerned.219  
 
To such effect, 2016 revised Eurojust guidelines for deciding which jurisdiction should 
prosecute is the most important attempt to organize the issue of concurrent jurisdictional 
claims in Europe.220 That is because it provides for the relevant factors that should be 
considered when issuing the decision on which jurisdiction should prosecute. These 
factors are territoriality, location of accused person(s), the availability and admissibility 
of evidence, obtaining evidence from witnesses, experts and victims, protection of 
witnesses, interests of victims, stage of proceedings, length of proceedings, legal 
requirements, sentencing powers, proceeds of crime, costs and resources. However, the 
priority and weight given to each one of these factors are different according to the 
merits of each case.  
 
B. Factors to be Considered in Solving the Positive Conflict of Jurisdiction 
In my opinion, taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of the three 
possible solutions to the dilemma of competing jurisdictional claims between states, I 
argue that the most effective solution is through the determination of certain factors to 
be considered and evaluated to decide the best jurisdiction which will take the exclusive 
competence over the cybercrime according to the facts and merits of each single case 
and taking into account the transnational nature and other characteristics that 
distinguish cybercrime from traditional crimes.  
 
 
219 EU Council Framework Decision 2009/426/JHA, art. 7/2, 2009 O.J. (L 138/14). 
220  GUIDELINES FOR DECIDING ‘WHICH JURISDICTION SHOULD PROSECUTE?’ 1, 
2-4 (Revised 2013), http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-
framework/Casework/Guidelines%20for%20deciding%20which%20jurisdiction%20should%
20prosecute%20(2016)/2016_Jurisdiction-Guidelines_EN.pdf. 
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Indeed, these factors can be utilized by the concerned states in the negotiation process 
or can be applied by an international body established according to an international 
instrument with an obligatory mandate to issue a binding decision in the case of conflict 
between states over competence in cybercrime. One example for such international 
body is the Eurojust which can issue, upon the request of the concerned states, a written 
non-binding opinion to solve a conflict over jurisdiction between those states.  In reality, 
the main advantage of this solution is the flexibility to cope with the features of each 
case.  
 
In addition, these factors should be exhaustive to allow the involved states to predict in 
advance to whom the jurisdiction should be granted if the dispute arises which shall 
surely assist in preventing the conflict at the very beginning or before its occurrence. 
Furthermore, these factors should not be given equal weight as some factors are more 
relevant than others in the light of transnational nature and other particularities that 
feature cybercrime. In the end, the decision in this regard will be taken on the basis of 
an aggregate balance of all these factors i.e. the jurisdiction will be granted to the state 
which can fulfill many of these factors more than others. 
 
Undoubtedly, the critical question here is how to determine such factors – essentially - 
what are the criteria that should be taken into consideration for determining these 
factors. In my opinion, the more effective way is by considering the interests of the 
different stakeholders in relation to cybercrime that includes like any other crimes, the 
involved state(s), victim(s), and offender(s). Since it is accepted internationally that a 
state can impose its jurisdiction in relation to cybercrime based on the territorial, active 
personality, passive personality, and protective principles. Therefore, these proposed 
factors should reflect the interest of all the concerned state(s) that can assert their 
jurisdiction over cybercrime based on any of the previous grounds. 
  
Thus, these suggested factors should include the interest of victim(s), the interest of 
perpetrator(s), the interest of the state where the crime was committed, the interest of 
the state of offender’s nationality, the interest of the state of victim’s nationality, the 
interest of the state whose one of its vital interests has been affected by the crime. In 
addition, these factors should contain the interest of criminal proceedings as it is 
essential to benefit all stakeholders.  
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1. Interest of the Victim(s) 
The first factor to be evaluated is the interest of victim(s) of cybercrime. In most cases, 
cybercrime involves a transnational dimension because the interconnected nature of the 
global networks permits the offender in one state to easily commit a cybercrime which 
affects several victims in many countries without leaving his/her own place.221 No 
doubt, such victims have a justified expectation that the state which will be granted the 
jurisdiction over the cybercrime will conduct the investigation and prosecution 
extensively and efficiently in a manner that will ensure the conviction of the criminal(s) 
and give them the opportunity to seek remedies and compensation. Also, they prefer the 
jurisdiction that can provide them with an effective program for the protection against 
any revengeful act by the perpetrator(s). Thus, the interest of the cybercrime’ victims 
should be considered as an important factor in determining the best state to prosecute 
solely a cybercrime subject to the jurisdiction of many countries. 
 
2. Interest of the Perpetrator(s) 
Besides the interest of the victim(s), the offender(s)’s interest should be considered as 
a relevant factor when issuing the decision in favor of one of the competing states over 
the jurisdiction in relation to the same cybercrime due to the following reasons. First, 
the perpetrator has an internationally well-recognized right to a fair trial which starts 
with the investigation process and extends to the final judgement. It includes the 
following rights:  
o The right to equality and equal treatment by the law i.e. the principle of non-
discrimination “art (26) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (International Covenant),222 and art (24) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)”.223  
o The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty throughout the period 
of criminal investigations and trial proceedings, up to the end of the final 
appeal “art (14/2) of the International Covenant,224 and art (6/2) of the 
 
221 See discussion supra note 19. 
222 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 179. 
223  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 151, Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July. 18, 1978). 
224 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 176. 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention)”.225  
o The right to respect his/her privacy, family, home and correspondence “art 
(17) of the International Covenant,226 art (11) of the American 
Convention,227 and art (8) of the European Convention”.228  
o The right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him, to have 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense and to 
communicate with counsel of his/her own choosing, to have prompt legal 
assistance upon arrest and detention in order to guarantee the right to an 
efficient defense and protect the physical and mental integrity deprived of 
his/her liberty, to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he/she cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court,  and to call or examine 
witnesses “art (14/3 a,b,d,e,f) of the International Covenant229 and art (6/3 
a,b,c,d,e) of the European Convention”.230  
o The right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt 
or to remain silent “art (14/3 g) of the International Covenant231 and art (8/2 
g) of the American Convention”.232  
o The right to freedom from torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or 
punishment “art (7) of the International Covenant,233 and art (5/2) of the 
American Convention”.234  
o The right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal and to have a 
fair and public hearing and judgement. As well as, to equality of arms and 
adversarial proceedings “art (14/1) of the International Covenant).235  
 
225  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 3, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
226 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 177. 
227 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 223, at 148. 
228 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 225, 
at 4. 
229 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 177. 
230 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 225, 
at 3. 
231 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 177. 
232 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 223, at 148. 
233 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 175. 
234 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 223, at 146. 
235 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 176. 
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o The right not to held guilty on account of any act or omission that did not 
constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed “Art (15/1) of the 
International Covenant”.236 
o The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and 
penal procedure of each country “Art (14/7) of the International 
Covenant237 and Art (8/4) of the American Convention”.238  
o The right to appeal the judgement “Art (14/5) of the International 
Covenant”.239 
 
Second, the offender may have a legitimate interest in refusing the removal from the 
place where he lives and works to be prosecuted in another state where he does not 
know the local legal system or langue or the possible punishments may be much greater. 
In addition, he may possibly not be able to work during the period of the investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication processes which will impose a further financial burden. 
Moreover, in the case of conviction, the defendant still has the right to communicate 
with his/her family on a regular basis and to receive the rehabilitation and integration 
programs in his/her own society as well. Furthermore, he must be secured against any 
act of revenge from the victims in a foreign country that he may be extradited to. 
Therefore, the offender can raise many arguments against his extradition to another 
country even if the required conditions according to the applicable treaty exist.240 
 
In fact, all of these issues should be considered when assessing the interest of the 
perpetrator(s) as a relevant factor to be evaluated in determining the best state given 
jurisdiction over the cybercrime in the case of positive jurisdiction conflict with others.  
 
3. Interest of the State of the Territorial Jurisdiction 
The third factor to be assessed is the interest of the state of the territorial jurisdiction. 
This ground for jurisdiction can be defined as the power of a state to apply its laws over 
 
236 Id at 177. 
237Id at 177. 
238 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 223, at 148. 
239 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 194, at 177. 
240 Kate Brookson-Morris, I. Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction, 56 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 659, 659 
(2007). 
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the crimes that are committed in whole or in part in its territory. Traditionally, the 
territorial principle has been considered as the most fundamental and well-accepted 
method of exercising jurisdiction because the place of commission is the best venue to 
collect the evidence. Therefore, it could be the most convenient venue for the trial.241 
 
In fact, many authors still confirm the primacy of territorial principle in relation to 
jurisdiction over cybercrime because it is usually initiated by an offender who exists in 
a specific territory of one state.242 In addition, national laws and the international or 
regional cybercrime instruments usually provide for the territorial principle as a base 
for acquiring jurisdiction over the illegal act committed in whole or part in the national 
territory, on board a ship raising the national flag or on board a plane registered under 
the national law.243 
 
On the contrary, I agree with the opinion that the jurisdiction based on territorial 
principle has less importance over cybercrime than traditional crimes for several 
reasons. First, this crime is committed in cyberspace which is an amorphous space that 
does not occupy a set physical or geographic location i.e. it is an electronic place in 
which individuals, governments, corporations, and other entities can exist within and 
beyond the borders of the nation states.244 Thus, cyberspace has no territorial based 
boundaries as data can be transported from one physical location to any other location 
without any substantial delay or physical barriers that might otherwise keep 
geographically remote places and people separate from each other. Therefore, this 
architecture of cyberspace undermines the claim that cyberspace should naturally be 
governed by territoriality defined rules.245 
 
Second, it is difficult to pinpoint where the cybercrime actually took place as the 
criminal usually uses technological tools to make the crime seems to come from 
elsewhere and he/she may conceal his/her location by looping a large number of 
 
241 See discussion supra notes 102, 103. 
242  Henrik W.K. Kaspersen,  supra note 189, at 21; see also Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Modernism, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 561, 568 (1998). 
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computer systems in many countries before attacking the target as illustrated in chapter 
two.246 Such a difficulty leads to making the territorial jurisdiction base less relevant in 
the context of cybercrime.247 Third, unlike the traditional crimes that usually happen 
within one state’s territory, cybercrime has a transnational dimension as a cybercriminal 
can easily commit several offenses in many countries simultaneously so that it is not 
usually linked to a single state.248 
 
Likewise, Phillip Kastner and Frederic Megret state that “It is evident that the 
territoriality principle, one of the principles on which national criminal jurisdiction is 
usually based, is only of limited use in the context of cybercrime. There may be no 
single locus delicti in the traditional sense; several offenders may act together yet from 
different locations; experienced crackers can route their activities through portals in 
jurisdictions without specific legislation; and digital evidence may be dispersed on 
servers located in different jurisdictions.”249 
 
At the international level, the drafters of Arab Convention recognize the weakness of 
territorial principle relating to cybercrime when they provided in Article (30/3) a 
detailed order of priority regarding the competing jurisdictional claims. They are as 
follows: (i) states whose security or interests have been disrupted by the offense; (ii) 
states in whose territory the offense was committed; and (iii) the state of nationality of 
the offender.250 In sum, I contend that all of pre-mentioned arguments undermine the 
weight of cybercrime’s location as a factor to be considered in the case of a positive 
conflict of jurisdiction between two or more states. 
 
4. Interest of the State of the Offender’s Nationality 
The third suggested factor in this regard is the interest of the state of the offender’s 
nationality. Actually, the universal acceptance of nationality principle as a base for 
asserting criminal jurisdiction has encouraged most of cybercrime national laws to 
 
246 See discussion supra notes 41, 43 . 
247 Jean-Baptiste Maillart, supra note 11, at 4. 
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Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 2015). 
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extend their jurisdiction if the crime is committed by one of its nationals abroad as 
shown in detailed in chapter four of this study.251  
 
In reality, I contend that, besides the arguments in favor of the application of the 
nationality principle as a well-established ground of jurisdiction,252 the exercise of this 
basis is urgently needed in the case of cybercrime for several reasons. First, it allows 
the state of nationality to prosecute its national committing a cybercrime from a location 
which is not subject to the territorial sovereignty of any state or from unknown place 
upon the return back to home. Otherwise, this crime will not be punished. Second, it 
prevents the nationals of one country from travelling to another country to commit a 
cybercrime and returning back to his/her own state without the possibility of being 
prosecuted if the national law prohibits the extradition of nationals to a foreign state. 
Third, the criminal could welcome the exercise of such jurisdiction in order to be 
prosecuted in a legal system he knows.253 Hence, I argue that this factor should have 
more importance in prioritizing the competing jurisdictional claims relating to 
cybercrime.  
 
5. Interest of the State of the Victim’s Nationality 
The fifth factor that should be considered in deciding the state that will be granted the 
jurisdiction over cybercrime is the interest of the state of the victim’s nationality. As 
illustrated in chapter four, a state may extend its jurisdiction over serious crimes 
committed abroad against one of its own nationals that is called the passive nationality 
principle  and some national laws extend their jurisdiction to cover a cybercrime 
committed abroad against their nationals.254 
 
Generally, the passive nationality principle has become an accepted base for exercising 
jurisdiction. In spite of that, it is still criticized due to the problems that arise as a result 
of its application.255 Regarding cybercrime, this ground for asserting jurisdiction is 
found in a limited number of international or regional instruments in relation to 
 
251 See discussion supra note 114. 
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cybercrime and few countries include this basis for asserting their jurisdiction in 
national laws.256 In addition, the attacks against computer systems and data stored in 
them are usually not directed against individuals of a particular nationality.257 Thus, I 
allege that this factor should have less relevance in prioritizing the concurrent 
jurisdictional claims between two or more states over a particular cybercrime. 
 
6. Interest of the State whose Vital Interest(s) has been Affected by Cybercrime 
The sixth factor that should be evaluated in deciding this conflict is the interest of the 
state whose one of its vital interest has been affected by the cybercrime. Nowadays, as 
discussed in chapter four,258 protective principle is a well-established concept in 
international law that allow a state to extend its jurisdiction over a crime committed 
abroad by aliens which cause substantial harm to one or more of its vital interests in the 
national territory like the state’s security and the integrity of its governmental functions. 
Regarding cybercrime, many international and regional instruments allow the states 
parties to impose their jurisdiction based on the protective ground. At the national level, 
several national laws can be applied based upon the application of protective principle 
as well. Therefore, I consider this factor as an important one with high weight among 
other suggested factors. 
 
In reality, the cybercrime may negatively affect and cause extensive damage to more 
than one state and all of them could claim their jurisdiction over this crime based on the 
application of the protective principle. In such case, the crucial question here is to which 
affected country the exclusive jurisdiction over the crime should be given if the other 
suggested factors in this chapter are equal. In fact, it seems logical that the best 
jurisdiction in this case is the country that has suffered the most harm as a result of this 
cybercrime.  
 
However, what is the metric that can be used to measure such harm? Actually, the 
prevailing opinion in this regard is that the harm should be assessed in the light of 
number of victims and their financial loss which should encompass the funds that the 
offender(s) defrauded or stole from them and any other reasonable cost to include the 
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cost of interruption of service, responding to the offense, restoring the data or repairing 
the affected  system, conducting a damage assessment, and other relevant costs.259 
 
Nevertheless, the metric of victims number and their monetary loss can be inadequate 
in measuring the harm in relation to some types of cybercrime such as economic 
espionage and stealing military technology from a state or the obstruction of its vital 
systems.260 In several situations, it can be difficult to assess the amount of harm as many 
victims may not report the case so that a state may find it hard to illustrate the damages 
in its territory as a result of a cybercrime.261 
 
7. Interest of Criminal Proceedings 
In fact, one of the most important factors to be considered when deciding the state that 
will be granted the exclusive jurisdiction over cybercrime is the interest of criminal 
proceedings. This can be achieved by the most efficient legal system, among the 
competing jurisdictions, to prosecute and adjudicate a cybercrime in the manner that 
could secure a conviction in a fair trial.  
 
Actually, the efficiency of the concerned legal systems can be evaluated according to 
several elements as follows: First, the availability of witnesses or experts to prove the 
crime or if they are aboard, the existence of an effective electronic system to allow them 
to provide their testimony remotely via video conference or other means of online 
communication. As well as, the availability of well-established system for their 
protection against the possible revengeful acts by the perpetrator(s).262  
 
Second, the admissibility of evidence before the national court i.e. whether the evidence 
that could be collected from foreign authorities and Internet Service Providers will be 
legally accepted in the trial without any objection from the defendant.263 Also, the 
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applicability of the statute of limitations or other defenses that the defendant could 
raise.264  
 
Third, the potential punishment according to the national law in the case of conviction 
after the completion of trial process. However, it is enough that the national law 
establishes an adequate penalty for such crime as there should not be any consideration 
to the more intensive sentence in the competing national laws.265 Otherwise, this will 
result in obliging the states to make their penal laws much harsher in the manner which 
does not adequate with the seriousness of the crime. 
 
Fourth, the availability of a higher technical capabilities that can assist in collecting the 
required evidence and conducting the needed analysis of data and information to 
discover all the offenders and determine the caused damages. Also, the existence of the 
required experience and skills at the law enforcement authorities with regard to 
computer forensic and cybercrime in the manner that qualifies them to conduct the 
investigation and prosecution with great efficiency.266  
 
Fifth, the stage of development of the criminal proceedings in the competing states 
should also be taken into account.267 In addition, there should be an evaluation whether 
it is possible to divide the prosecution of the concerned cybercrime case into separate 
cases in two or more jurisdictions where the perpetrators and victims exist without 
prejudice to the interest of criminal proceedings in each country. In fact, the 
investigation and prosecution process of complicated transnational crime will 
frequently lead to the possibility of a number of prosecutions in different 
jurisdictions.268 Indeed, this solution is effective as it will encourage all forms of 
international cooperation between the concerned states especially the mutual legal 
assistance to enhance the criminal proceedings in each one of them. 
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Sixth, if the criminal is already arrested, a sufficient consideration should be given to 
the location of the custody taking into account the efforts that have been undertaken in 
relation to the criminal investigation that lead to the apprehension.269 
 
Hence, I argue that this factor should have more importance in prioritizing the 
competing jurisdictional claims relating to cybercrime. However, it is not an easy task 
to decide which national legal system is the more efficient and effective one among 
other competing jurisdictions for the legal proceedings against cybercrime. Indeed, one 
method that could help in this regard is the establishment of an international review 
mechanism to assist and evaluate the efficiency of a national legal system against 
cybercrime. A similar one exists in relation to the implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption.270 
 
To further clarify, A sample hypothetical example can demonstrate how the pre-
mentioned factors could be applied in a particular case. If there is a conflict of 
jurisdiction over the same cybercrime between the state of victim nationality (country 
A) and the state of the offender’s nationality (country B). In such a case, there are two 
factors which will not be assessed or examined which are the interest of the state of 
territorial jurisdiction or the interest of state whose vital interests have been affected by 
the crime. That is because this conflict does not involve any of those two states.  
 
However, there are three other factors which should be evaluated: the interests of 
victim, offender, and criminal proceedings. Therefore, if both countries A and B can 
equally achieve these interests effectively, country B should take the exclusive 
competence over the crime because the interest of the state of the offender’s nationality 
is more relevant than the interest of the state of victim’s nationality as seen above. On 
the contrary, if country A can achieve all or two of these interests better than country 
B, the priority should be given to country A. Finally, the decision should be reached 
after considering and examining the previously mentioned factors and can be taken by 
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a certain body established for such a purpose or by the concerned states themselves after 
conducting the negotiation.  
 
Another instance is the Love Bug virus case,271 unfortunately the perpetrator was a 
Filipino and committed his crime from the Philippines which refused his extradition to 
the United States of America or other requesting countries because his act was not a 
crime at this time according to the Philippine law. However, if the Philippines had a 
law which criminalizes such act. In this situation, there would be a positive conflict of 
jurisdiction between Philippines and other states including United States of America 
which affected negatively by this virus.  
 
By applying my proposed solution to such conflict and after evaluating the pre-
mentioned factors, the jurisdiction should be given to the United States of America. 
That is because each of those two countries would be considered as having a territorial 
jurisdiction because the virus was uploaded in the Philippines and downloaded in the 
United States of America. However, the latter would achieve the benefit of victims and 
criminal proceedings better than the former due to the well-established American legal 
system and the using of developed means of investigation against cybercrime. Whereas, 
the Philippines did not have these capabilities at this time. The Philippines only can 
achieve the interest of perpetrator who existed there and had an interest not to be 
extradited to a foreign state.  
 
Therefore, the United States of America shall fulfill the interest of victims and interest 
of legal proceedings; Whereas, Philippines will only achieve the interest of preparators. 
Finally, the decision here should be taken on the basis of an aggregate balance of the 
examined factors. Therefore, the jurisdiction would be granted to the United States of 
America which fulfills many of these factors more than the Philippines.  
 
One more example is the McKinnon v United States case,272 which is one of the most 
controversial cybercrime cases in the recent years. The facts of this case were as 
follows: a Scotland resident in England hacked into the US Pentagon system and got 
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sensitive data and deleted several files which impaired particular parts of the US defense 
network from functioning. Then, the USA requested his extradition for committing 
several cybercrimes but he objected against such extradition by raising many 
arguments. First, a plea bargain offered to him by US officials amounted to undue 
pressure and an abuse of process. second, he could be prosecuted in England for his 
crimes. Third, he suffered from autism and his extradition to the USA would amount to 
ill-treatment within the meaning of article (3) of the ECHR. Even though, all these 
attempts were dismissed by the court which decided his extradition to the USA. 
 
On October 2012, the UK’s Home Secretary refused his extradition due to his serious 
illness and decided that he could be prosecuted in the UK. However, on December 2014, 
the Director of Public Prosecution closed the case because it would be difficult to prove 
his crimes as the evidence was in the USA which would not cooperate with any 
prosecution in the UK. As a result, the UK had custody of the perpetrator but had no 
evidence against his crime; Whereas, the USA had indeed evidence but had no offender. 
Surely, the USA will seek his extradition upon his travel to another country. Actually, 
this case shows the negative results of the failure to reach a solution in the case of 
concurrent jurisdictional claims between states over a cybercrime. 
 
By applying my proposed solution to solve this conflict of jurisdiction between the UK 
and the USA, I find that the UK fulfills the interest of the state of the territorial 
jurisdiction as the hacking act was committed by the offender through a computer in 
England, the interest of the state of the offender’s nationality as he had the Britain’s 
nationality, the interest of the perpetrator who preferred to be prosecuted in the UK and 
raised several argument against his extradition to the USA as seen above.  
 
Whereas, the USA achieves the interest of the victim which was a governmental 
American institution that asked for his prosecution in the USA to secure his conviction 
and seek for the adequate compensation, the interest of the state of the territorial 
jurisdiction as the hacking act was committed against governmental computer system 
in the USA and caused substantive damages to it, and the interest of the state whose one 
of its vital interests has been affected by the crime as the offender deleted several files 
which impaired particular parts of the US defense network from functioning and 
committed other illegal acts which affected negatively the US’s national security. 
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Also, the USA achieves the interest of the criminal proceedings as there was already an 
investigation launched in the USA, most of the witnesses were existed in the USA, all 
of the evidence was in the USA, the US prosecutors were able to investigate and 
prosecute the case effectively in the manner which covers the full extent of the alleged 
criminality, the punishments for the alleged offences were harsher in the USA than the 
UK, the availability of a higher technical capabilities in the USA that can assist in 
collecting the required evidence and conducting the needed analysis of data and 
information to determine the caused damages. Therefore, the USA fulfills more of the 
suggested factors than the UK so that I argue that the jurisdiction should be granted to 
the USA.  
 
In sum, this chapter has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
approaches to deal with the dilemma of how to prioritize among the competing 
jurisdictional claims. It concludes by arguing that such a dispute over competence 
should be resolved by a decision taken after the assessment and evaluation of several 
suggested factors to include the interest of victim, interest of the perpetrator, the interest 
of the state where the crime was committed, the interest of the state of offender’s 
nationality, the interest of the state of victim’s nationality, the interest of the state whose 
one of its vital interests has been affected by the crime, and the interest of criminal 
proceedings. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Actually, the Internet has become one of the most important technological innovations 
in the recent years with a great positive influence on communications, financial 
transactions, and the operation of dozens of institutions around the world. However, 
such development in the use of the internet and computer technologies has increased 
the possibility of their misuse by committing the different forms of cybercrime such as 
the spreading of viruses as well as the unauthorized access to and illicit tampering with 
systems, programs or data. In addition, the traditional crimes like fraud, forgery, and 
theft can be committed with the assistance of or by means of computers, internet and 
related communications technologies. 
 
In most cases, the commission of cybercrime is linked with the two main features. The 
first one is the transnational nature of this crime and the second feature is the difficulty 
in deciding where the cybercrime actually took place or identifying the identity of 
cybercriminal. In fact, such challenges make the tracing of cybercrime very difficult 
and time consuming for the law enforcement authorities. In addition, they have 
increased the need to enhance international cooperation through the effective response 
to the mutual legal assistance and extradition requests in order to smoothly collect the 
evidence from another jurisdiction or apprehend the offender who exist in a foreign 
country. 
 
Furthermore, such cross-border dimension of cybercrime resulted in the adoption of an 
expansive approach in relation to the exercising of jurisdiction as a method to counter 
such extra-territorial crime. Therefore, jurisdiction over cybercrime can be asserted 
based on several grounds including territorial, active nationality, passive nationality, 
and protective principles. Such broad approach may lead to the dilemma of positive 
conflict over jurisdiction which may result in hindering the mechanism of effective 
international cooperation, violating the fundamental principle of “ne bis in idem”, and 
causing the duplication of efforts taken by the law enforcement officials of the involved 
states.  
 
Nowadays, there are three different approaches to deal with this issue. The first opinion 
favors the negotiation between the concerned states aiming at centralizing the criminal 
proceedings on one single country. The second view prefers the establishment of an 
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obvious and binding rule which decides the priority among the competing jurisdictional 
claims. Whereas, the third opinion supports the development of a guideline which 
includes non-exhaustive factors to be considered and evaluated to reach a decision 
which can solve this conflict. 
  
I argue that the most effective solution is through the determination of certain factors to 
be considered and evaluated in order to decide the best jurisdiction to take the exclusive 
competence over the cybercrime according to the facts and merits of each single case 
and taking into account the transnational nature and other characteristics that distinguish 
cybercrime from the traditional crimes. Such proposed solution is better than the 
attempt to solve such conflict through negotiation between the concerned states without 
providing them with determined factors to be considered in reaching a decision in this 
regard. 
 
I contend that such factors should reflect the interests of the different stakeholders in 
relation to cybercrime that include like any other crimes the victim(s), offender(s), and 
involved state(s) that can assert their jurisdiction over cybercrime based on any of the 
accepted grounds to include territoriality, active, passive, and protective principles. 
Thus, these suggested factors should include the interests of victim(s), perpetrator(s), 
the state where the crime was committed, the state of offender’s nationality, the state of 
victim’s nationality, the state whose one or more of its vital interests has been affected 
by the crime, and the interest of criminal proceedings as it is essential for achieving the 
benefit of all the stakeholders. 
 
In addition, these factors should be exhaustive to allow the involved states to predict in 
advance to whom the jurisdiction could be granted if the dispute arises which shall 
surely assist in preventing the conflict at the very beginning or before its occurrence. 
Furthermore, these factors should have different value as many factors are more 
important than others according to the transnational nature and other characteristics that 
feature cybercrime. Finally, the decision is taken on the basis of an aggregate balance 
of all these factors i.e. the jurisdiction will be given to the country that can fulfill many 
of these factors more than others. This decision can be taken by the concerned states 
themselves or by an international body established according to an international 
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instrument with an obligatory mandate to issue a binding decision in the case of conflict 
between states over competence in cybercrime. 
 
 
